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Abstract
Cognitive epistemic systems are reasoning structures that promote an individual’s
categorization of group members through processes known as cognitive epistemic
essentialist entitativity (EEE). The propensity of these processes to become stagnant is
known to lead to stereotyping and prejudiced behaviors when individuals are presented
with ambiguous information about outgroup members. Educational materials about the
contributions, cultural patterns, and social customs of ethnic and cultural groups can
reduce stereotyping and prejudiced behaviors. However, whether being presented this
material through multicultural psychosocial education in a formal setting is an effective
strategy to influence the malleability of EEE processes has not been addressed as a means
to shift xenophobic and prejudice discourse. The purpose of this quasi-experimental study
was to determine whether malleability of EEE processes resulted from the presentation of
multicultural psychosocial educational material in a college classroom. The epistemic
need for closure theory, intergroup contact theory, and essentialist theory of race
provided the framework for the study. The Essentialist Entitativity Scale was used to
compare the malleability of EEE processes of 67 college students who completed an 8week course based on multicultural psychosocial educational material and 67 college
students who did not. An ANCOVA analysis of pre- and posttest data revealed that
students who received the culturally rich educational material reported significantly
greater malleability of EEE processes than those who did not. Findings may be used to
inform educators, educational leaders, and social activists about the malleability of EEE
processes, and may provide a strategy to reduce racism, stereotyping, xenophobia, and
prejudice.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Cognitive epistemic systems are social processes by which the individual
generates truth, falsity, and judgments (Kosic, Phalet, & Minnetti, 2012). The processes
are known as epistemological attitudes and beliefs that are components of the individual
metacognitive systems of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). When epistemically
motivated, individuals are known to make ethnic categorizations that are thought to serve
as social reality. One epistemic process is essentialism. Rangel and Keller (2011);
Yzerbyt, Rocher, and Schadron (1997); and Haslam and Levy (2006) presented
essentialism as a process in which an individual considers group members as having an
underlying and immutable sameness. According to the essentialist theory of race (Chao,
Hon, & Chiu, 2013), an individual is prone to view another race in totality, believing all
persons belonging to that race share the same clear and unalterable physical and
psychological markings. When determining the identity and category of others and
interpreting others as fundamentally alike, the individual makes inferences referred to as
entitativity (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013). In social cognitive neuroscience, these
processes are known as epistemic essentialist entitativity (EEE; Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b).
The EEE processes are known to become stagnant resulting in the individual
ignoring differing or conflicting information than that presently held (Tadmor, Hong,
Chao, Wiruchnipawan, & Wang, 2012). Stagnation or freezing of the processes has been
noted when information and exposure to outgroups is not consistently presented, thereby
resulting in the individual’s tendency to group all who are perceived to be different (Chao
et al., 2013; Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013). In this study, I explored the malleability of the
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epistemic processes as a result of consistently introducing information about various
ethnicities and cultures through a multicultural psychosocial educational course.
Social expectations about outgroup members are referred to as the psychosocial
norm for race or expected outgroup norms (Bradley et al., 2004). The expectations
attached to the individual’s belief in racial outgroup psychosocial norms include the
assumption of knowing what is to be normally expected in the outgroup member’s
behaviors, beliefs, and attitudes. Research addressing the psychosocial norm for race or
group norms has shown the EEE processes are instrumental in shaping the expectations
an individual has regarding racial outgroups (Bradley et al., 2004; Nesdale, Maass,
Durking, & Griffiths, 2005). When the EEE processes are stagnant, previously held
skewed beliefs of the psychosocial norm for race have been shown to precipitate displays
of prejudice, racial hatred, and disdain toward members of racial and ethnic outgroup
members (Bradley et al., 2004; Nesdale et al., 2005).
Epistemic processes have been linked to an individual’s propensity to hold
prejudiced opinions, racist beliefs, and xenophobic attitudes (Ommundsen, Van Der
Veer, Yakushko, & Ulleberg, 2013; Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013; Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b; Tadmor et al., 2012). When EEE processes are frozen and individuals harbor
prejudice and xenophobic attitudes, race relations in a growing population of immigrants
in the United States can be tenuous. Given the mix of racial groups in the United States, a
study addressing harmonious racial and ethnic integration of outgroup members may
promote positive social change.
Chapter 1 includes the background of the epistemic processes and decisionmaking, the lack of research addressing these processes, and their propensity to freeze or
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become stagnant. I present the purpose of this study, research questions and hypotheses,
theoretical framework, nature of the study, definitions of terms, assumptions, limitations,
and delimitations. I also explain the significance of examining EEE processes as they
relate to theory and race relations, as well as the implications for positive social change.
Background
Research has shown that epistemic processes are a catalyst in motivating an
individual’s construction of knowledge through the act of applying subjectivity to social
reality (Kruglanski, 1989). The epistemic need for closure is a theory that addresses the
motivational nature of the process of cognitively constructing perceived knowledge in an
attempt to form firm answers to ambiguity (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Known to
affect an individual’s information processing and cognitive salience, the need for closure
is a tendency to engage in quick judgments based upon perceived knowledge.
Information is processed with a sense of urgency and permanence in an attempt to gain
rapid mental closure when ambiguous stimuli are introduced (Roets & Van Hiel, 2010).
Epistemically, the need for closure assists in providing a desirable judgment made
quickly and easily, while considering any additional information as inconvenient (Rangel
& Keller, 2011) and unimportant. The need for closure additionally assists in the
individual’s depleted cognitive salience with regards to information considered
ambiguous or contradictory. Possessing a tendency of permanence, an epistemic process
protects the information, holds on to it, or freezes it in an effort to strengthen the
consolidation of knowledge and protect the epistemic processes from any further
contradictory information. This processing procedure is known to lead to stereotyping
and prejudice (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
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The epistemic processes include decision-making processes (Kubota, Banaji, &
Phelps, 2012) in which the amygdala, a subcortical structure in the anterior lobe of the
brain, plays an important part. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is another region of
the brain involved in cognitive control tasks such as decision-making (Botvinick, Braver,
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). Neuroimaging indicates these areas of the brain show
less activity or inactivity when EEE processes freeze and do not allow for additional
cognitive processing of perceived ambiguous information. Neuroimaging research has
provided evidence of both ACC and amygdala activation, also known to be the process of
unfreezing the individual’s EEE processes with consistent viewing of phenotypic
stimulus (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). However,
the ability to unfreeze the EEE processes through exposure to multicultural psychosocial
education that teaches ethnic differences and similarities; culturally specific behaviors
and beliefs; and concepts of stigma, stereotypes, classism, prejudice, and racism has not
been studied.
Statement of the Problem
Researchers have not adequately addressed how the cognitive epistemic processes
are affected through exposure to multicultural psychosocial education. Although previous
researchers have shown that multicultural experiences have an enhancing effect on the
simple cognitive and generalized motivation of learning in an individual, more specific
cognitive processing that occurs at deeper levels related to the epistemic essentialist
processes have not yet been studied (Tadmor et al., 2012). Research assessing an
individual’s cognitive tendency to endorse stereotypes through consistent and long-term
exposure to multicultural experiences has shown that the individual may become
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somewhat receptive to searching for additional new material following this consistent
exposure (Tadmor et al., 2012). However, research has also shown that the exposure to
multicultural indicators, such as phenotypical stimuli being experienced or brief
interpersonal encounters in a consistent and long-term manner, has not been consistently
correlated with epistemic change, either permanent or temporary. The lack of movement
in the EEE processes has been demonstrated through the simple mentioning of a name in
which cultural and semantic attributes are present. These attributes are powerful enough
to activate stereotypes thought to be secondary to the epistemic essentialist entitativity
processes becoming stagnant (Uhlmann & Cohen, 2007). This practice, frequently seen in
discriminatory hiring situations, has been shown to be consistent with aversive racism
and the freezing of the epistemic essentialist entitativity processes (Ahmed, 2010) and
requires further study to examine the effects of brief and long-term exposure to
multicultural experiences.
The intent of this study was to explore the effect of psychosocial educational
materials about multicultural practices, languages, individuality, and outgroups on
cognitive salience through the EEE processes and their malleability among college
students. I examined whether this type of educational material prevents the freezing of
EEE processes or unfreezes the processes to make them more malleable. I investigated
whether consistent and informative portrayals of outgroups would result in a shift in
xenophobic and prejudice discourse for individuals and social groups. Haas (1992)
argued the epistemic community is one way to account for the influence a knowledgebased expert has in defining and explaining complex problems. A knowledge-based
expert is considered a professional with recognized expertise as well as competence in a
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particular discipline. By investigating the impact of a multicultural psychosocial course
taught by an expert in the field, I hoped to catalyze further exploration of consistent
exposure through learning about differing cultures and ethnic groups from those
considered an epistemic community.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this quantitative study was to determine whether significant
differences were observed in the malleability or unfreezing of the EEE cognitive
processes between individuals who participated in a multicultural psychosocial
educational course and those who had not. Previous research showed that multicultural
experiences enhance simple cognitive generalized motivation rather than more specific
cognitive processing at deeper levels, such as those related to the epistemic essentialist
processes (Tadmor et al., 2012).
Nature of the Study
A quantitative approach was appropriate to examine epistemic essentialist
entitativity. I employed a quasi-experimental design to compare the depth of cognitive
salience of participants as managed by the EEE processes. The results obtained from the
sample may be generalized to the college population of interest. In keeping with the
essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954;
Pettigrew, 1998) and Need for Closure (NFC) (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), I examined
how cognitive epistemic essentialist entitativity is affected by multicultural psychosocial
information.
The introduction of the information was done through the presentation of
psychosocial educational material in a standard one term, 8-week, multicultural
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psychosocial course at a Midwestern community college. The educational material
consisted of an introduction to the history, contributions, cultural patterns, and social
customs of major ethnic and cultural groups located in the United States (see Appendix
A). I examined whether participating in a psychosocial culturally rich educational course
would promote the unfreezing or malleability of the cognitive epistemic essentialist
entitativity processes. The unfreezing or malleability of the EEE processes is
characterized by an individual’s awareness of the incompleteness of his or her
internalized representations of another culture or outgroup (Roets, Arne, & Van Hiel,
2011). The results of a posttest served as the dependent variable (DV) as measured by the
Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The following served as this study’s research questions and hypotheses:
Research Question 1
Is there a difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the malleability of
epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who have
participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who
have not?
H01: There is no difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who
have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those
who have not.
Ha1: There is a difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who

8

have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those
who have not.
Research Question 2
Is there a difference in the epistemic essentialist-driven depth of cognitive
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a
multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not?
H02: There is no difference in the epistemic essentialist-driven depth of cognitive
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a
multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not.
Ha2: There is a difference in the epistemic essentialist-driven depth of cognitive
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a
multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not.
Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study was partially grounded in the essentialist
theory of race (Chao et al., 2013). This theory proposes that individuals believe race is a
stable and natural entity and is the biologically based essence of an individual. The theory
additionally refers to the freezing or stagnation of the epistemic cognitive processes
involved in essentialism (Chao et al., 2013). The role of racial essentialism has been
found to be influenced by the individual’s cognitive need for racial categorization. Racebased categorization has been linked to increased race-based essentialism as well as to
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individuals’ heightened tendency to discern racial group membership quickly and easily
(Chao et al., 2013).
Wagner et al. (2010) argued the essentialist theory of race presents a cognitively
and culturally logical basis for thinking that enhances the tendency to essentialize or
group together members of outgroups as mutually exclusive entities. Wagner et al. (2010)
argued essentialist thinking is a form of cognitive processing in which the individual
assumes an underlying essence or substance in others. The individual is then seen to have
the tendency to possess both the ability and desire to process the outgroup as one having
an essence. This reasoning is based on the individual’s tendency to consider the genes of
another to be the causal agent for the observable behavior. The effects of this cognitive
process while compiling essentialist attributions based on social beliefs have been shown
to have a significant influence on developing stereotypes, outgroup discrimination,
racism, and xenophobia (Allport, 1954; Wagner et al., 2010; Wagner, Holtz, & Kashima,
2009).
Keeping this theory in mind, it is important to consider the individual’s
inclination to gather essentialist attributions based on social beliefs that have been shown
to be cognitively processed. This is done in an attempt to group those of a similar
essence. I applied this theory to help me answer Research Question 1 by examining
potential differences in the depth of cognitive salience through the malleability of
epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who participated in
a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who did not.
Intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) also served as a
theoretical framework for this study. Stemming from an extension of contact theory
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(Cameron & Rutland, 2006; Nelson, 2009), intergroup contact theory suggests that
individuals who interact with members of outgroups develop positive concepts regarding
members of the outgroup. According to Pettigrew (1998), the prejudiced individual
develops a propensity for essentialist entitativity from a lack of positive and personal
interactions with those in outgroups. Pettigrew argued that individuals will cognitively
guide themselves to essentialist entitativity without conscious effort when not exposed to
outgroups.
The theory of cognitive need for closure (NFC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) also
guided this study. NFC refers to an individual’s cognitive epistemic need to draw quick
and convenient conclusions while blocking or freezing against the cognitive processing
of contradictory information; a reduced level of cognitive saliency is known to be
precursor to racism and behaviors of essentialism (Rangel & Keller, 2011). This theory
assisted in answering Research Question 2 and the possible unfreezing or malleability of
the EEE systems. The essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact
theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) guided
the examination of the epistemic essentialism entitativity processing known to be an
important variable in the development of racist attitudes and behaviors. These theories
are discussed further in Chapter 2.
Operational Definitions
Amygdala: The region of the brain considered to be highly involved in social
decision-making processes as well as individuals’ current racial attitudes (Botvinick et
al., 2001).
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Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC): A region of the brain that monitors the
individual’s response to stimuli and response competition.
Blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) MRI: A noninvasive technique used to
assess oxygenation under physiologic and pathophysiologic conditions (Neugaren &
Golestaneh, 2014).
Electrophysiology: The study of biological cells and tissues as they relate to
biological brain cells (Rule, Freeman, & Ambady, 2013).
Epistemic processes: Individual metacognitive systems of knowing that serve as
the individual’s knowledge-based regulatory validation of information (Hofer & Pintric,
1997; Richter & Schmid, 2010; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
Epistemic freezing: A neurocognitive process by which an individual’s epistemic
processing seizes and freezes social information while preserving it and strengthening it
in an attempt to protect against any new or contradictory information (Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).
Epistemic seizing: A metacognitive process by which the individual quickly
processes information to fulfill the need for knowing (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon,
2000).
Essentialism: The metacognitive process providing for the belief that all members
of a social category share an unchangeable and fixed underlying nature (Rangel & Keller,
2011; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
Entitativity: An epistemic process in which a collection of individuals are
distinguished together as a singular group without possession of individual attributes
(Campbell, 1958; Clark & Wegener, 2009; Rasinski, Crocker, & Hastie, 1985).
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Executive control: Management and control of reasoning, problem solving, and
cognitive processing (Botvinick et al., 2001).
Fusiform gyrus (FFA): A brain function known to assist in the processing of
racial information and in-group facial recognition (Kubota et al., 2012).
Magnetic response imaging (MRI): A test using magnetic fields and radio wave
energy to produce images of body organs (Aragona, Kotzalidis, & Puzella, 2013).
Medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC): A portion of the human brain that is stimulated
when an individual is reasoning and explaining out-group behaviors and intentions
(Mason & Morris, 2010).
Need for closure: An epistemic process by which an individual seeks clear and
enduring answers to ambiguous social stimuli (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Roets &
Van Hiel, 2010).
Mirror neurons: Brain cells known to fire when an individual acts and observes a
behavior of another, in turn, allowing the individual to mirror the behavior as if the
observer was the acting individual (Winerman, 2005).
Neuropsychology: A scientific field in which the relationship between the brain,
behaviors, and mind are assessed (Mason & Morris, 2010).
Neuropsychological signaling: The process by which various areas of the brain,
through neural activity and circuitry signals, influence an individual’s executive control
and processing (Botvinick et al., 2001; Mason & Morris, 2010).
Positron emission tomography scan (PET scan): Nuclear medical imaging
technique providing 3-D images of body organs by detecting gamma rays (Millet et al.,
2013).
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Psychosocial norm for race: Psychosocial factors and social norms assigned to
racial categories (Bradley et al, 2004; Nesdale et al., 2005).
Xenophobia: Fear or hatred of those from other countries, or any stimulus that is
perceived as strange or foreign (Kumar & Seay, 2011); an attitude and
behavioral prejudice toward immigrants and anyone who appears foreign (Ommundsen et
al., 2013).
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations
Assumptions
The Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011; see Appendix
B) is a 12-item instrument used to assess the level of belief structure the individual holds
about racial groups, and to assess the epistemic belief concepts of race uniformity, race
inherence, and informativeness. I assumed this instrument had not been used previously
with any of the participants in the study; therefore, bias from instrument exposure should
not have been an issue in this study. I also assumed the sample size was appropriate for
this study,
and I followed the administration and scoring requirements as directed for the
Essentialists Entitativity Beliefs scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). Finally, I assumed the
participants would answer the questions honestly and completely.
Limitations
A primary limitation was external validity. I conducted a quasi-experimental
study to examine malleability in the EEE processes, and participants’ previous
experiences with members of outgroups were acknowledged as assessed by the
Participant Post-Study Questionnaire (see appendix C). The questionnaire asked the
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participants about any unpleasant experiences with members of an outgroup during the
eight week period of time in which the study was being conducted. Any negative
experience may be considered a threat to the post-test beliefs and reflected on the
participants post-test. Additionally, threats to internal validity were considered by
comparing both groups’ scores prior to the multicultural psychosocial educational
material being introduced. Selection bias was also considered. To mitigate selection
history and selection maturation threats prior to the study, I asked participants in the
comparison group to refrain from engaging in a multicultural educational course during
the 8-week research period.
To address construct validity, the generalizability of the IV was considered by
which I considered the current course content as being generalizable to all participants
and the population as a whole. The content of the 8-week course included cultural and
ethnic information per the course curriculum guide. The course covered broad cultural
differences and offered participants a thorough education regarding predominant cultures
residing inside and outside of the United States. The curriculum addressed the face,
predictive, and concurrent validity issues that should have been considered in research
with an IV such as a multicultural psychosocial course. The current curriculum validty
was addressed through periodic assessment of the participant’s knowledge of the material
that was presented. The measurement was taken several times throughout the term by
tests and quizzes.
Last, a confounding variable was participants’ daily encounters with those in
outgroups while participating in the study. Any random encounters and experiences the
participants had during the study could not be controlled. To mitigate this threat, I asked
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participants to report any significant encounters outside of the course via the debriefing
form.
Delimitations
I examined malleability of the EEE processes in individuals by measuring the
processes both before and after participation in a multicultural psychosocial educational
course. The EEE processes were assessed for any measurable movement in both male and
female undergraduate college students age 18 and over from a large Midwestern
community college. Participants included those who were enrolled in a multicultural
psychosocial educational course and those who were not enrolled or had never enrolled.
I did not intend to examine the effects of short-term and inconsistent exposure to
the educational material and did not include participants under the age of 18 years. As the
EEE processes have not been shown to become stagnant or freeze in early childhood or
adolescence (Tadmor et al., 2012), the inclusion of this age group would have been
neither relevant nor feasible. The inclusion of graduate students was not considered
because this population was not available at the community college of interest. Male and
female college students who have never engaged in a multicultural psychosocial
educational course were included as a comparison group.
The dependent variable was results of the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) measuring the level of belief structure of the individual as well
as epistemic belief concepts. I chose this empirically sound scale to assess epistemic
thought processes in the treatment and control groups.
The theoretical perspectives that grounded this study were the essentialist theory
of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact theory (Allport 1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and
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cognitive NFC. These theories served as frameworks for examining the participants’
responses. The intergroup contact theory guided the immediate intergroup learning
between the participants. This theory purports those experiencing intergroup contact are
apt to develop increasingly positive concepts regarding outgroups. NFC, which is a
process related to cognitive essentialism (Rangel & Keller, 2011), was also used to guide
the study.
I used a convenience sample of 134 undergraduate college students 18 years of
age and older. The sample included those enrolled in the multicultural psychosocial
course and those who had not participated in such an educational experience.
Significance of the Study
I investigated the possible malleability of the epistemic essentialist entitativity
processes, an underresearched area in social cognitive neuroscience and the social
psychology disciplines. Prior research indicated that individuals who have experienced
epistemic motivation have less implicit and explicit prejudice toward outgroup members
(Lun et al., 2007). I examined whether malleability or unfreezing of the EEE systems
occurred through consistent exposure to multicultural psychosocial information. Lun et
al. (2007) illustrated through classic social psychology experiments that those who
experience a motivation to acquire knowledge elicited by a state of uncertainty use the
opinions currently held in the immediate social context in an attempt to form judgment.
The results of these studies provided much needed insight into the epistemic cognitive
processes and offered a catalyst in researching the role of a multicultural psychosocial
education in reducing intergroup bias and stereotype endorsement.
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The limited functioning or nonfunctioning of the EEE process is a known
precursor of prejudiced behaviors (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b), aversive racism
(Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013), and xenophobic attitudes (Ommundsen et al., 2013).
Because the epistemic system is known to freeze and become stagnant (Tadmor et al.,
2012), this investigation into the malleability of the EEE processes through multicultural
exposure may allow for social change in providing a greater understanding of the role of
multicultural experiences and educational materials. The findings provided insight into
whether the exposure to knowledge about outgroups can be considered as a possible
means to encourage malleability and a positive change in attitudes and behaviors toward
outgroup members previously viewed as sharing one essence.
Extended contact theory (Cameron & Rutland, 2006), which is based on
intergroup contact theory, may assist in encouraging further research and exploration into
the long-term outcome. Future examinations into the effect of exposure and contact
through consistent multicultural exposure may assist in the knowledge of ways to keep
the EEE processes from freezing or becoming stagnant. According to Monteith (1993)
and Rudman, Ashmore, and Gary (2001), an individual requires conscious intention,
time, and effort to achieve stereotypical judgments. My study addressed the more recent
work that has indicated that in some cases prejudice and implicit stereotyping could be
reduced or altered without the individual’s deliberate attempt and efforts. Further
research into the effects of exposure may enhance the understanding of the development
and changing of what were once thought to be implicit cognitive judgments. This may be
accomplished by presenting information that is no longer considered ambiguous or
contradictory.
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Implications for Social Change
In a country where segregation (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013) and racial
categorization (Tadmor et al., 2012) remain prevalent, the need for the investigation as to
why these phenomena continue is necessary. The increasing demographic heterogeneity
(Kumar & Seay, 2011) has augmented the necessity to recognize and address the
continuing prevalence of outgroup discrimination, strained race relations, and racism.
The unreasoned fear of anything perceived as foreign or strange is known to foster
xenophobic reactions to outgroup members (Ommundsen et al., 2013). Based on these
circumstances, there is a call to enhance individuals’ adaptation and tolerance to a more
culturally and socially complex society.
According to D’Souza (1996), individuals must cognitively process themselves
and their in-group as being distinguishable based on the existence of biological
differences. Additionally, D’Souza (1996) described the belief of superiority and
inferiority and the individuals holding of these ranks as being innate or intrinsic. These
beliefs are linked to the EEE processes as a whole and involve a proposition about the
existence of racial essences (Roets & VanHiel, 2011b). Appiah (1990) and Ikuenobe
(2010) argued the individual with extrinsic racial categorization and xenophobic
tendencies suffers from a cognitive incapacity that is manifested by the resistance of
contradictory information due to the freezing of the EEE processes.
When the outgroup is seen as possessing more entativity, the tendency for
increased negative evaluations exists. Related to the development of xenophobia, the
presumed entativity of the outgroup is perceived as being unified and working in an
orchestrated manner, thereby enhancing the level of distrust and prejudice (Ommundsen
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et al., 2013). This study served as an important catalyst into the continuing examination
and dialog regarding multicultural psychosocial education to be required from
Kindergarten through higher education. The socializing behaviors and xenophobic
attitudes of individuals may be reduced by increasing familiarity with members of
outgroups under consistent conditions, and offering the perceiver the ability to not allow
for the subconscious freezing of the epistemic system.
Transition
The cognitive processes of EEE have been known to be instrumental in the quick
seizing and freezing of information in an attempt to prevent and guard against ambiguity
and contradictory information. Having seized upon this information, the individual
guards against or freezes out any new or contradictory information. The malleability of
the individual’s EEE processes had yet to be addressed.
With the introduction of multicultural psychosocial material, the epistemic
essentialist driven processes of the individual’s currently held thoughts for the
psychosocial norm for race may become malleable; however, there has been a lack of
research on this topic. This study focused on the specific neurocognitive processing of the
EEE system following the introduction and inclusion of culturally rich psychosocial
material. The results of this research may provide valuable information about the
individual’s neurocognitive perceptions for the psychosocial norm for race and the
flexibility of those perceptions and cognitive processes. Chapter 2 provides a
comprehensive literature review on epistemic essentialism and entativity as the processes
relate to outgroup membership and the theoretical frameworks that support each
hypothesis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
This chapter includes a review of the current and relevant literature on epistemic
processes, including the essentialist theory of race and its components. Included as well
are the elements of essentialism, the elements of the essentialist belief process (both
psychological and genetic), the essentialist processes and race relations, essentialism and
social and racial categories, neuropsychological processes as they relate to race, racial
categorization, stereotyping, and prejudice.
Additionally, social class and essentialism, social cognitive tendencies, and causal
attribution are explored. Thirdly, xenophobia, the belief in essentialist social
determination, the lay theories of essentialism, gender differences, gender and
essentialism, and subjective essentialism are investigated. Lastly, this chapter includes
prior research regarding essentialism as it relates to epistemic cognition, epistemic
attitudes, epistemic freezing. Further, the relationship between cultural neuroscience and
cognitive incapacity, intergroup perception, and cognitive incapacity as they lead to
essentialism are investigated. Chapter 2 also addresses the relevance of racism,
xenophobia, epistemic cognition, the epistemic need for closure, and attitudes.
Additionally, epistemic seizing and freezing, entitativity, culture and neuroscience as
they relate to EEE are reviewed. Finally, the methods of the measurement of the EEE
processes are reviewed.
The purpose of this quantitative study was to understand the epistemic essentialist
entitativity (EEE) processes and their malleability through the introduction of
multicultural psychosocial education. Currently, there is a significant lack of empirical
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research regarding how, or whether, the individual’s exposure to this type of curriculum
contributes to any differences in his or her EEE level of processing.
Literature Search Strategy
A thorough review of the literature was conducted from 2012 to 2014 on research
dating from 1954 to 2014. Included were the PsycINFO, PubMed, BIOMED Central
Neuroscience, SocINDEX, and BIOMED databases. The key words and phrases searched
were epistemics, essentialist, essentialism, racism, stereotyping, outgroup prejudice,
epistemic essentialist entitativity, neuro-psychological judgment, prejudice, unfreezing,
PET scan, magnetic response imaging (MRI) bias, neuropsychology, prejudice, and need
for closure. Literature was retrieved from Walden University, University of Saint Francis
Indiana, and Indiana University Medical School.
Theoretical Foundation
Considering the essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), this study was
grounded in part on the premise that the individual believes that race is a stable and fixed
natural entity. Furthermore, the theory posits the individual considers race as an entity
that is biologically based and is the fixed essence of an individual. The seizing and
freezing of the epistemic cognitive processes, the EEE, according to this theory, involve
the individual’s processing of essentialism (Chao et al., 2013) and is related to the
cognitive motivation of the belief of the psychosocial norm for race.
The components of the essentialist theory of race were described by Chao et al.
(2013) as depicted by an individual driven by the epistemic process of essentialism.
Essentialism, as a component of the cognitive epistemic processes, references the
individual who is epistemically motivated and is known to make ethnic categorizations
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that serve as social reality (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Entitativity, included in this
theory, encompasses the individual’s propensity to determine the identity and category of
others, and in turn interpret them as fundamentally alike (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013). As
a sector of social cognitive neuroscience, these are collectively referred to as the
epistemic essentialist entitativity (EEE) processes (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
Intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998) proposes the individual
who works with and learns about outgroup members in a consistent manner will develop
more positive concepts about them. The unfreezing or malleability of the EEE processes
are explored by the introduction of the face-to-face multicultural psychosocial
educational course regarding differing cultures, ethnicities, and psychosocial norms.
Cognitive NFC assists in the guidance of the theoretical aspects of this research as this
theory addresses the individual cognitive epistemic need to procure convenient and quick
judgments of members of perceived outgroups. This process relates to cognitive
essentialism (Rangel & Keller, 2011) and assists in exploring the possibility of
unfreezing and/or the malleability of the EEE processes.
Literature Review
Epistemic Processes
The epistemic processes are epistemological attitudes and beliefs that are
components of the individual metacognitive systems of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich,
1997). Richter and Schimd (2010) described the personal epistemology systems of an
individual as those that consist of their beliefs about the nature and processes of knowing
in which the epistemic strategies serve as knowledge-based regulatory validation of the
information received. Included in this process is individuals’ capacity to be epistemically
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motivated to make ethnic categorizations, which they believe to be a social reality (Roets
& Van Hiel, 2011b).
Epistemological processes encompass the individual’s beliefs about the nature of
knowledge and personally knowing. These beliefs can be regarded as the “subjective
equivalent of epistemology” (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b, p. 54). Kienhues, Bromme, and
Stahl (2008) described the theoretical philosophy of epistemology as one that is
concerned with the criteria, characteristics, and justification characteristics the individual
considers prior to engaging in essentialist thoughts and beliefs.
When comparing epistemological beliefs to metacognitive knowledge, Flavell
(1979) noted that individuals experience like beliefs in the coherent, complete, and
adequate beliefs systems in knowledge and knowing. Earlier models of epistemological
beliefs show evidence of the epistemological and the psychological processes of
metacognitive knowledge as those that are based upon the major theories that draw upon
epistemological beliefs and those beliefs that are related to psychological mechanisms
(Richter & Schmid, 2010). Epistemic motives inspire essentialist beliefs about racial
groups according to Roets and Van Hiel (2011b). Additionally, Roets and Van Hiel
(2011b) argued the epistemic essentialist entitativity (EEE) processes inspire essentialist
beliefs about racial groups that influence the individual’s “color blind” ideology.
Epistemic cognition (EC) is a significant component of human cognition and the
epistemological process. This cognitive process instigates the epistemic beliefs in which
an individual will view beliefs about current knowledge as that of knowing (Braten, Britt,
Stromso, & Rouet, 2011). Chinn, Buckland, and Samarapungavan (2011) described EC is
an umbrella term that is intended to encompass the reflective judgment process and the
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epistemic beliefs of the individual. Additionally, the processes of epistemic cognition
have been approached as a multidimensional structure of independent beliefs (Chinn et
al., 2011).
Epistemic Signaling Systems
Self-esteem is considered to be an epistemic signaling system the individual
accesses in an attempt to assess his or her global self-esteem. In other words, the
individual will attempt to assess his or her understanding of the presented social reality
(Stinson et al., 2010). The individual’s self-esteem, as argued by Stinson et al. (2010), is
one in which the epistemic signaling system alerts the individual as to whether the social
feedback he or she perceives receiving is consistent with his or her chronically perceived
values.
Leary and Baumeister (2000) argued the individual who embraces the epistemic
acceptance signaling system will in turn exhibit a classification structure in which the
signaling of acceptance or the rejection of phenomena changes the person’s self-esteem.
This change, according to the self-verification theory (Swann, 1997), suggests that the
person has an epistemic signaling system that notifies the individual whether social
feedback is consistent or inconsistent with his or her global self-esteem. This epistemic
neuropsychological signaling system indicates the individual’s global self-esteem is
based upon the ability to regulate his or her social thoughts and behaviors (Stinson et al.,
2010). When unsure or faced with an ambiguous situation, individuals with low global
self-esteem will respond with avoidance, whereas those with a higher level of global selfesteem will respond with a healing or mending response (Stinson et al., 2010). This
indicates individuals who rely on their global self-esteem will attempt to predict future
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behaviors and social outcomes and base their interpersonal behavioral and cognitive
thought processes based on that perceived reality.
Epistemic certainty has been characterized by Swann and Schroeder (1995) as the
individual’s feelings of certainty, control, and epistemic confidence, while the individual
who is experiencing epistemic confusion will feel uncertainty, puzzlement, and
psychological discomfort. The epistemic system may provide signals when a discrepancy
between the individual’s current perceived social feedback is processed. This will then
activate the person’s self-regulatory efforts in an attempt to reduce the perceived
discrepancy, which has been shown to imitate the regulatory effort to decrease any
perceived discrepancies between the self-view and social feedback (Stinson et al., 2010).
Epistemic Attitudes
Epistemological attitudes serve the individual with an important function in
regulating the use of epistemological strategies. These may include knowledge-based
validity of the received information, as well as the individual assessing internal
consistency (Richter & Schmid, 2010). The epistemic attitudes and processes are
described as cognitive activities that take place when the individual is faced with
interrelated topics, including the source from which the knowledge originated. The
current belief system, perceived evidence, perceived truth, and an understanding via
cognitive processing mechanisms are all involved in epistemological attitudes (Chinn et
al., 2011).
Epistemological attitudes are found to affect self-regulated learning, which in turn
can lead to an individual’s rapid attempt to engage in essentialist thinking and
metacognitive processing. Additionally, these beliefs and attitudes are known to affect an
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individual’s self-regulated learning strategy (Richter & Schmid, 2010). Chinn et al.
(2011) described a network of epistemic cognitive processes in which five
distinguishable components are recognized. Included are the goals individuals adopt in
which they pay special attention to the inquiry into a situation and the results of that
inquiry as they perceive them. Additionally, the simple or complex structure of the
individual’s thought of knowing holds a significant role in the processing of information
(Chinn et al., 2011).
Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, and De Grada (2006) proposed the cognitive
epistemic processes as those in which the individual is dependent upon epistemic
authority when faced with ambiguity. As individuals develop within their sociopsychological environment, they will move away from considering the parents and other
adults as epistemic authorities and will in turn move toward their peers and perceived ingroup members. This move promotes the attempt to collectively form their opinions
while the group consensus is sought to define a personal social reality.
The source of knowledge plays an important role in the individual’s justification
for his or her beliefs. The attitudes of believing, doubting, and endorsements of
information intake are all considered (Chinn et al., 2011). Virtues and vices, as explained
by Chinn et al. (2011), are to be considered when assessing the individual’s perceived
epistemic goals. These include the epistemic processes of open-mindedness and
intellectual courage while accessing the need for the cognitive and epistemically
motivated NFC.
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Epistemic Need for Closure
The need for cognitive closure (NFC) is considered a cognitively accessible
construct and a significant epistemic motivational component that affects the fundamental
epistemic social nexus (Kruglanski et al., 2006). The NFC is identified as a major
epistemic motivation associated with an individual’s judgment and decision-making
processes (Chiu et al., 2000; Pierro, Kruglanski, & Raven, 2012). This epistemic process
has been defined by Kruglanski et al. (2006) as the individual’s desire for a stable and
firm answer to what has been perceived as an ambiguous or confusing situation. Webster
and Kruglanski (1994) expounded on the definition by asserting that individuals who
have a higher need for epistemic closure will seek closure quickly to an ambiguous
stimulus in line with the immediacy principle. The process is included in the permanence
principle of adhering to that quick decision without acknowledging and considering
alternatives. The individual will seize the most accessible cognitive alternative and freeze
their current mindset.
Individuals with a strong need for cognitive closure have been found to have an
urgent and permanent seizure of the information leading to epistemic freezing (Pierro et
al., 2012). These individuals that have been considered impervious to any additional
relevant information and are prone to making strong judgmental commitments.
Kruglanski et al. (2006) described the epistemic NFC as a nonspecific representation of
an individual construct that determines how an individual will process information and
adjudicate personal judgment. Kruglanski et al. (2006) proposed the possibility that the
epistemic NFC induces and enhances group-centrism, a behavioral syndrome defined as a
pattern of societal pressures the individual endures in an attempt to form an opinion of
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uniformity, rejection of perceived deviants, resistance to change, and the perpetuation of
group norms.
The concept of the epistemic need for cognitive closure has been identified as an
important epistemic process assisting in the understanding of an individual’s motivation
of utilizing subjective knowledge and beliefs about the social world, as well as
knowledge construction and protection (Kruglanski & Webster; 1996; Roets & Van Hiel,
2010). The individual’s epistemic NFC leads to essentialism (Chinn et al, 2011). Found
to be a reliable progressive source in an individual’s cognition and social inquiry, NFC is
thought to be based on the individual’s epistemic needs and desires. Additionally, this
epistemic cognitive framework has been found to assist in the individual’s ability to
differentiate social dimensions. This has been considered when exploring the individual’s
strategies for learning new information and the sources the individual seeks out to gain
such information (Chinn et al., 2011). These processes, within the field of epistemic
thought processes, have been studied by philosophers in an attempt to identify the
interconnectedness of both concepts and issues that have influenced a person’s epistemic
processes and beliefs (Chinn et al., 2011).
Not unlike metacognitive knowledge, Richter and Schmid (2010) argued that
epistemological beliefs are similar to stable learner characteristics in which the individual
will exert a profound amount of influence on the individual learning process.
Motivational states have been known to mediate this influence via the epistemic
processes (Lalwain, 2009; Pierro et al., 2012; Richter & Schmid, 2010; Rubin, Paolini, &
Crisp, 2011).
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Motivational states in an individual are known to mediate the epistemic processes.
Discussed by Richter and Schmid (2010) the level of motivation has been found that
although possibly opposed to an individual’s current standpoint it may continue to oppose
the gathering and learning of contradictory information. When separate knowing had an
effect on the use of epistemic strategies, it was found to depend upon the objective
characteristics and the individual’s familiarity with the information that was gathered
(Richter & Schmid, 2010).
As an epistemic process, the cognitive NFC is identified in those who prefer
predictability and stable knowledge across varying circumstances. Those with a high
NFC are correlated with the individual feeling discomfort with ambiguity when
experiencing aversive situations that are simultaneously void of closure (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011b).
Lalwani (2009) argued an important process in obtaining closure is the
individual’s need to possess epistemically secure information when using judgment and
referencing cultural groups. Furthermore, those with high NFC grasp influences and often
utilize perceived cultural differences in social responding to secure cognitive decisions.
Additionally, in two studies conducted by Lalwani (2009) it was suggested that
individuals who were influenced by the NFC, with regards to socially desirable reactions
to cultural differences, were affected simultaneously by two different processes. The first
is indicated by increasing the individual’s tendency to engage in “culture-congruence” by
responding in a socially desirable manner. Secondly, and simultaneously, is the
individual that is shown to have a decreasing tendency to engage in cultural-incongruent
socially desirable responses (Lalwain, 2009).
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Kruglanski and Webster (1991) proposed the individual with a high level of NFC
reacts in a significantly more negative way towards anyone who has undermined the
ability of a group to make consensual decisions. Rubin et al. (2011) argued this
phenomenon could not explain the NFC that relates to deviant bias, although it does offer
alternative explanations to Kruglanski and Webster’s (1991) argument. Rubin et al.
(2011) suggested those with a high NFC may become frustrated when the need to
maintain structured social categories is present. Additionally, Rubin et al. (2011)
presented this as a possibility of being secondary to the individual feeling disdain in their
inability to maintain a well-ordered and organized social situation and categorization.
The epistemic NFC assists the individual in providing the self with a desirable
judgment that is made quickly and easily while considering any collateral information as
an inconvenience (Rangel & Keller, 2011). The epistemic system additionally protects
the individual’s information and assists in making the information or knowledge
permanent. This “freezing” of the information is done in an effort to strengthen the
consolidation of the individual’s knowledge and block any perceived contradictory
information from being obtained (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). When attempting to create
permanence, the epistemic system protects the current knowledge and disallows the
ability to free up the process of knowing with regards to the current level of perceived
knowledge regarding the outgroup subject.
A significant personal cognitive NFC is the individual’s desire to have closure
quickly and enduringly. The individual with a strong NFC will tend to seize upon
judgment and information, and in turn, be closed off to any additional information
(Kruglanski et. al., 2006) Additionally, this individual will greet new and ambiguous
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information with a desire of comfort and result in a quick and rapid NFC that will be
more suspicious of other possibilities and options (Chiu et al., 2000; Webster, &
Kruglanski, 1994).
Chiu et al. (2000) described motivated cultural cognition as that of an individual
who seeks to respond to an ambiguous social event by intensifying their reliance upon
implicit theory. Individuals with a heightened NFC base their judgments on
predominantly pre-existing cues and knowledge as opposed to any subsequent
information. Furthermore, Kruglanski and Webster (1996) argued the NFC, when
heightened, relies upon more stereotypes instead of case specific information due to
stereotypes being based on pre-existing knowledge structures. The overuse of the preexisting cues allows the individual to justify the tendency to use the perceived knowledge
as accurate even when different subsequent evidence is presented.
Epistemic Seizing and Freezing
Pirttila-Backman and Kajanne (2001) argued the early stages of exploratory
development in the individual acts as a catalyst for epistemic development, and in
adulthood the need to explore any contradictive information is not a crucial need. The
NFC motivates the individual in a way that may affect how information drawn from
social interaction is processed. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) described two processes
as a result of this effect, the act of seizing and freezing of information as one that is
preceded by the individual’s urgency and permanence tendencies. Those with a
heightened NFC will attempt to avoid discomfort from bothersome ambiguous
information and quickly seize the perceived information. The permanence tendency
denotes the individual’s attempt to immediately preserve past knowledge and protect
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against processing any new information. Kruglanski and Webster (1996) presented the
process as one of the “seizing and freezing” of information that may affect not only the
individual’s information processing, but also the individual’s ability in processing the
mediation of multiple social psychological information processing systems.
Based upon these theories the individual may feel more assured of their
judgments and feel no need to process any additional information prior to committing to
the judgment. This lack of additional situational hypotheses seeking leads to the seizing
of the information. The person is comfortable and confident enough with the seized
information sensing the credibility, plausibility, and certainty will then lead to epistemic
freezing (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
The freezing process represents the avoidance of any further dissolution of the
information possessed when the individual is confronted with new information. The
blocking of new information is an attempt to maintain consensual judgments. When
freezing information, and preserving it for future use, the individual has a tendency to
prefer opinions that will potentially be unchallenged and associate with others who share
the same. This surrounding of similar-minded others will additionally allow for positive
regard for those groups and in turn allow negative feelings toward those with different or
opposing opinions for fear of disrupting the consensus (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996).
Previously formed stereotypes, from a social psychological perspective, have
been noted to offer early cues when considering formed attitudes that include stereotypes,
prejudice, and memories. Thought to supersede prior knowledge, configurations of the
seizing and freezing of memories suggest the individual may utilize a pre-existing
knowledge base under a heightened state of NFC. This may be due to the processing of
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case-specific information known to substantially slow down closure and thought to be
stereotypes that are highly accessible in the individual’s memory (Kruglanski & Webster,
1999).
Kruglanski, Peri, and Zakai (1991), described the crystallization stage as the
epistemic process in which the individual’s opinion is solidified, thereby enhancing the
NFC during the pre-crystallization stage leading to a seizing intensity. In the postcrystallization stage the individual who has a heightened NFC will then strengthen the
process of freezing leading the individual to a sense of gratification. Individuals are found
to experience a decreased level of confidence in their judgment prior to crystallization
whereas the individual in the post-crystallization phase have a relatively increased sense
of confidence. While attempting to seize information, the extent and intensity in which a
person will seek out information is known to be more aggressive and intense than when
attempting to freeze information and judgments. The individual attempting to seize and
freeze information, as explained by Kruglanski et al. (1991), results in an increase in
epistemic reluctance to consider and search for additional or new information.
Kruglanski and Webster (1996) studied the epistemic process of freezing in
individuals with a heightened sense of NFC who possessed a prior opinion and found that
a considerable amount of disagreeing and conflict arose between those with a prior
opinions and with those who held a different opinion. This “fight rather than switch”
process is found to be potentially dysfunctional in those individuals who could not, or
would not, exert the energy in what is considered an arduous task of further information
processing. Even as the goal of closure is in the forefront of processing tasks, the
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functional autonomy from those with differing input is seemingly shut down and
shunned.
The NFC is an area of the epistemic processes which is focused upon identifying
the cognitive foundations of prejudice. Included, in addition to Kruglanski & Webster
(1996), is the theory for Need for Structure (NFS; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Both of
these approaches focus upon the individual’s epistemic processing. For example, the
person’s tendency to incorrectly process incoming information. These processes and
outcomes have been linked to the person’s cognitive processing style which have been
indicated as being a pre-cursor to stereotyping and prejudiced behaviors towards
disparaged groups (Hong, Chao, & No, 2009)
Hong et al. (2009) described the understanding that a person may have regarding
the pure nature of race creates a lens in which he or she will perceive the
acknowledgement and understanding of racial differences, and in turn, hypothesize a
racial realness or reality. In turn, this will lead to the individual’s personal way of
encoding, representing, and organizing the information when it is related to race.
Epistemics and Emotions
To decide whether to engage in systematic thinking the individual must be
epistemically motivated (Kruglanski, 1989). Individual differences have been found to
affect a person’s epistemic motivation (De Dreu & Carnevale, 2003) and an intensified
level of epistemic motivation has been shown, according to Stuhlmacher and
Champagne, (2000) to decrease the level in which the individual will utilize a selective
information processing effort. Epistemic processing and motivation are shown to
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influence this processing of information by way of the individual’s current emotional
state (Van Kleef, Homoan, Beersma, Knippenberg, Knippenberg, & Damen, 2009).
The processing of information and the strategy used to process information is
dependent upon the person’s epistemic motivation and emotions and in turn, the person’s
basis for their behavior is on the preponderant affective state (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
This epistemic metacognitive process is considered the manager of the cognitive
resources. The individual will engage this epistemic action and direct it to cognition
(Brink & Lilljenfors, 2013).
Emotion and attention were described by Brinck (2001) as a perceptional
component of metacognition which institutes the “experimental” element of
metacognition involving the individual’s emotions and attention, as well as their beliefs
and feelings. The link between emotions and intergroup relations, as based upon
functional theories is consistent with the idea that emotions can function as adaptive
mechanisms and are thereby linked to the production of clear cognitive, behavioral, and
physiological responses as are perceived to be challenging to environmental stimuli
(Dasgupta, DeSteno, Williams, & Hunsinger, 2009).
The appraisal of groups, in particular those groups unrelated to intergroup
relations, affect the information processing of the perceiver. Serving as internal signals,
in an attempt to assist the individual to steer through outgroup threats, emotions have
been shown to influence an individual’s processing of information regarding outgroups.
As argued by Bodenhausen et al. (2001) not unlike NFC, rapid action is influenced by the
emotion of anger which promotes the individual’s heuristic style of information
processing and increases the reliance upon stereotypes. This is done, in an attempt to
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quickly satisfy the individual’s cognitive and emotional signals. Sadness and the need for
caution, as argued by Dasgupta et al. (2009) are the only emotions shown to promote
information processing which did not rely heavily on stereotypes.
Described by Koriat (2000) this process consists of information and theory-based
judgments in which the individual will access a form of cognition which entails a high
degree of consciousness and control. When epistemic actions are felt to be needed, the
individual will desire a “distance to the goal” (Brinck & Liljenfors, 2013, p. 90). This
action being directed toward the person’s epistemic cognitive functions will “alert” them
when an inadequate cognitive goal is being reached. The individual will then implement a
plan to enhance and re-organize the information and quickly search for new information,
in an attempt to repair the perceived insufficiency.
The social perspective on epistemic processes was investigated by Van Kleef et
al. (2009) and it was proposed that emotion is a by-product of the epistemic process
which can influence the person by acting as a catalyst in conveying information. Found to
have an effect on in-group relations, socially based epistemic processes have been
investigated as the processes pertain to outgroup relations as well. The interpersonal
effects of the individual’s emotions can largely develop with isolation, further solidifying
the freezing effect of the epistemic process. Dependent upon the individual’s motivation
epistemic processes, emotions are found to influence judgment and decision making, both
affecting outgroup and in-group relations (Van Kleef et al., 2009).
Finding the individual’s epistemic emotions being developed within isolation,
Van Kleef et al. (2009) argued he or she may be guided by not only their own emotions,
but the emotions of others, dependent upon their epistemic processing. This finding may
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be relevant to future research regarding the continuing attempt to keep the epistemic
processes malleable regardless of the mind-set and emotions of others.
Proposing emotional contagion co-ordinates with the individual’s contagion and
interacts with social circumstances, Keltner and Haidt (1999) posited the reactions of an
individual are predictive of the person’s level of epistemic motivation. Social information
and the emotional reaction of others have most commonly only been investigated in a
social context. However, the emotional reaction of an individual may be dependent upon
the dynamic appraisal process. Van Kleef et al. (2009) described by Allport (1953) an
individual will make an effort to explain if their thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are
prejudiced by true, actual, imagined, or implied preferences of others.
Social preferences and social dimensions, as described by Manstead and Fischer
(2001) may be incorporated and specified as an emotional response in which the concept
of social appraisal introduced.as behaviors, feelings, and thoughts. The association
between cognitive emotional appraisal and emotional experience was described by
Mumenthaler and Sander (2012) as one in which the individual will assess the emotional
event and at the same time be affected by the way others feel about the same situation.
This epistemic occurence was investigated (Mumenthaler & Sander, 2012) and found to
influence the individual’s self-reported emotions based upon the presented event.
Functional theories can also be relied upon in the consistent linking of emotion
and intergroup relations. The linking is recognized as taking place when emotion is
considered a mechanism which is flexible and malleable, in an attempt to create
responses to external stimuli. The sought after responses result from the individuals
attempt to alleviate ambiguity, competitiveness, or confliction via specific cognitive,
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physiological, and behavioral actions (Dasgupta et al., 2009). Furthermore, Fisk (1998)
described emotions as influencing an individual’s cognitive processes when assessing
outgroup members.
Promoting the reliance on stereotyping judgments, through epistemic processes,
Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) argued both the emotions of anger and
happiness are correlative. Dasgupta et al. (2009) investigated the primary way in which
emotions increase stereotyping, finding that the emotions, anger and disgust had similar
effects upon the individual’s implicit attitude toward outgroup members. Implicit
attitudes and stereotypes commonly function within the individual’s subconscious.
Dovidio, Gaertner, Kawakami, and Hodson (2002) maintained this to be especially noted
in aversive racism. Finding larger effect sizes in a 2009 study, Dasgupta et al. argued the
individual will show an increased level of implicit bias against outgroups. This occurence
was also noted even when the individual had not identified any previously existing biases
against the group, until experiencing the emotions of disgust or anger. Additionally, a
significant correlation was found between the incidental emotion of disgust and implicit
anti-gay bias as well as bias against individuals who identified as Arabs as presented by
Dasgupta et al.(2009). Dasgupta et al. (2009) argued, the significant impact of emotions
on implicit outgroup evaluations, especially when implicit biases are applicable to the
stereotypes and threats the individual has attached to the target group.
Essentialism
Using the inductive potential, the first element of the essentialist belief process
has been identified as the process in which the individual uses inferences to allow the
assumed knowledge of group membership (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Social categories are
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considered as having an existence, reality, or ontological status which allows the
perceiver to cognitively process members of another social group as having an underlying
“sameness” or coherence which is immutable (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Rangel & Keller,
2011; Yzerbyt et al., 1997).
Haslam, Rothchild, & Ernst (2000) noted typically identified within the aspects
associated with essentialist beliefs were categories comprising several dimensions of
cognitive processing. One dimension is “judged naturalness” considered the process in
which the individual judges the naturalness, immutability, and stability of another
category. Further categories identified include, “rated uniformity” and “exclusiveness”
(Haslam et al., 2000, p. 117).
Psychological Essentialism
Essentialism or essentialist thinking has been defined as the belief that all
members of a particular social category, share stagnant, unchangeable, and a fixed
underlying nature (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Essentialist thinking is exhibited by an
individual who infers another’s core characteristics are easily identifiable by their group
membership. According to Rangel and Keller (2011), the individual does not typically
base their beliefs on a biological basis, but upon a person’s characteristics. It is more
often a result of identifying the proposed correlates and consequences of psychological
essentialism from which a person will draw upon to identify group membership. This
would include the observed behaviors of others, the habitual attributes, and disposition
assumed to be associated with the individual’s upbringing and background by assisting in
explaining who the person is and what makes them who they are (Rangel & Keller,
2011).
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Kashima et al. (2005) described the process of essentialism as one in which a
person is considered to have the same essence-like and unchangeable characteristics,
even more than those within the social group in which the individual was considered to
have equal agency. As long ago as 1958, Campbell questioned whether essentialism was
to be considered as the ontological status of social groups. Campbell argued the
individual possessed particular “wholes” or sums which make up entities where others do
not. Entitativity, claimed Campbell, (1958) was simply the degree in which a person will
have the nature of an entity, or in other words, a real and tangible existence. Kashima et
al. (2005) argued this concept was often taken for granted by which the individual
believed others are more a real entity than that of a social group.
As long ago as 1924, Floyd Allport made references to social psychology as a
practice in which the belief in the philosophical study of the being and its nature,
existence, and reality, or ontological status of an individual is present. This as opposed to
groups, argued Allport as reported by Yzerbyt, Judd, and Corneille (2004) was not
essentially encompassing the psychology of human beings and should not be categorized
as a contraindication to the psychology of the individual themselves. However, Yzerbyt,
et al. (2004) presented Entitativity as a useful method to clarify how the ontological
concept indicates the extent to which a group of individuals is a true and real entity.
Two aspects of entititativity are essentialism and perceived agency (Brewer,
Hong, & Li, 2004). Psychological essentialism according to Hamilton (2007) was
presented in 1992 by Rothbart and Taylor as an aspect of social categories, race and
gender for instance, that are perceived by the individual to have their existence deeply
entrenched in nature. Therefore, they are considered to have essential properties based
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upon surface appearances and causal connections that cannot be changed by human
intervention.
Kashima et al. (2005) described essentialism as the process in which an individual
relates the inductive potential of another based upon one observation. This observation is
attributed to a single social category and may be considered as one which makes the
members of that social category analogous to each other, both in their appearance, but
behaviors as well. This perceived group entitativity is utilized to form group impressions
as opposed to individual perceptions.
An additional form of essentialism is that of conceptualized thoughts in which
there is perceived inalterability or the belief the properties of the social entity targeted are
not changeable by human intervention. Those individuals who prescribe to the entity
theory are apt to believe the underlying characteristic of a social group or entity is the
essence which is viewed as causal for the group’s appearance and behaviors. This entity
is therefore incapable of changing the underlying group membership, either easily or at
all (Kashima et al., 2005).
Biological Basis for Essentialism
An element of the essentialist lay theory provided an explanation of the causal
nature of essentialist beliefs according to Rangel and Keller (2011). These authors
suggested a key element of conceptualization was essentialism and causal factors. Bastian
and Haslam (2006) referred to this as a genetic determination factor of essentialism and
explained how the lay theory of endorsing essentialism explains social perception.
As shown in research conducted by Bastian and Haslam (2006), Hoffman and
Hurst (1990), and Keller and Bless (2004) the biological basis for essentialist beliefs
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introduced both the plausibility of the reference to the genetic basis for essentialist
theorizing as well. Additionally, these authors argued that the biological basis for the
individual assigning attributes through essentialist processing was equal to the perception
of naturalness.
Essentialist Process and Race
The essentialist theory of race addresses the theory that individuals view other
races in totality, as an essence in which all person belonging to that race and share
immutable and unalterable physical and psychological markings (Chao et al., 2013).
When the essentialist processes are accessed, the individual is likely to determine the
identity and category of the outgroup member as fundamentally alike. According to the
theory, they will then use this identity to determine “inferences”, also referred to as
entitativity (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011).
When discussing the essentialism of race, Hong et al. (2009) argued the individual
will deny the “real” race as a racial essence. For some, contended Hong et al. (2009) the
average person will often invent racial classification in an attempt to provide convenient
and readily accessible labels for persons who are perceived to be unequal between
groups. Some individuals will simply utilize the racial classifications as a form of
convenience and quick NFC processes in an attempt to categorize others when social
circumstances may be potentially challenged (Fairchild, Yee, Wyatt, & Weizmann,
1995).
Race as a social construct may be viewed as one which is arbitrarily fashioned by
the individual secondary to social circumstances and historical events. This process being
recognized as one which is malleable and fluid appears to provide for any differences the
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individual observes between racial outgroups as those who do not represent the inherent
differences between groups (Hong et al., 2009). Essentialism is considered a process in
which the individual who believes in this feature of social group support the notion the
social group can never be changed and therefore support and tend to form more robust
stereotypes (Levy, Plaks, Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001).
Essentialism and Social Categories
Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) argued that race and ethnicity might just be the
most relied upon of social categories in modern times. Essentialism has come to be
recognized as a productive catalyst in the activation and application of stereotypes
(Pereira, Estramiana, & Gallo, 2010). Dependent upon the visually observed
characteristics of another, the individual seeks categorization based upon clearly
observed appearances. Visual characteristics in turn, allow the perceiver to assume all
members appearing alike share the identical inherent essences (Piereira et al., 2010).
Yzerbyt and Rogier (2001) claimed the essentialism process provides for the individual to
perceive both similarities and differences in the outgroup member.
When observing the differences between categorization theories and essentialism,
Medin, Goldstone, and Gentner (1993) discussed essentialism as the by-product process
in which assumptions of similarities are made as a result of categorization. Based upon
these assumptions of essence, those belonging to the group will also be assumed to have a
deep quality of “likeness” such as in behaviors and values (Pierira et al., 2010).
Social categorization via the essentialist process has been found to further support
the inferences an individual makes regarding which shared group members are thought to
possess the same attributes and qualities of all others within the group (Pereira et al.,
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2010). Social psychologists, such as Medin and Ortony (1998) considered essentialism to
be a psychological process in which the individual’s representation of others reflects their
belief that others all share the same essence. Cognitive psychologists such as Hirschfield
(1996) argued that the cognitive biases an individual maintains allows for the creation of
social categories as well.
The individual’s essentialist beliefs may manifest through the implicit assumption
that individuals possess regarding the structure and categories that surround them in the
world (Gelman, Clay, & Gottfried, 1994). Haslam (2011) commented on Dar-Nimrod
and Heine’s 2011 research and claimed the findings provided a clear and articulate
reasoning based upon the cognitive essentialist processing an individual engages in.
Racial Essentialism
Smith (2001) references racial essentialism as playing a significant role in the
formation of prejudice. Ethnic nationalism according to Smith (2001) is one such form of
psychological racial essentialism. Chao (2007) and No et al. (2008) discussed race as
being a meaningful source of human division that was based upon the inferred essence of
racial groups. It’s suggested by utilizing an individual’s race to engage in racial
essentialism offers the person the opportunity to make judgment based upon what were
believed to be fundamental and biologically clear differences.
This process, maintain Chao (2007) and No et al. (2008) offers the perceiver
assistance in understanding and making sense of their social world by allowing race to
indicate a member’s abilities and traits. This social psychological reasoning regarding
stereotyping and prejudice led researchers, Yzerbyt et al. (1997) to theorize the traditional
view of stereotypical behavior, explanations, and rationalizing of stereotypes were
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cognitive strategies used by an individual to simplify the processing of social
information. Additionally, these cognitive strategies are thought to serve as a functional
role for stereotypes by assisting the individual in rationalizing social situations (Yzerbyt
et al., 1997).
The stereotyping process is more than the individual viewing others attributes as a
list associated with a particular social category. This will take place as well as the
individual performing an all-encompassing and underlying explanation linking all
attributes together. This linking process provides the individual an account for the
category association between stereotypical attributes and category labels. Social
inequalities refer to unjust treatment that is rationalized based upon the Yzerbyt et al.
(1997) explanation of essentialist behaviors and beliefs. Additionally, it’s known the
individual who makes essentialist inferences is more apt to harbor aversive racism, a
covert and modern form of discrimination (Rodenborg & Boisen, 2013).
Culture and Essentialism
When perceiving an individual in an entitative way, in psychological essentialism,
the individual is clearly perceived to be more entitative than others. When the
individual’s characteristics are perceived as being more consistent between two
observations, as well as perceived as being more difficult to change, the individual will
identify with these characteristics more so than those of another family or group
membership. This was found to be especially prevalent in English-speaking and
European cultures (Kashima et al., 2005).
When assessing the essentialism of social targets, culture appears to play a role in
the moderations of the perceived essentialism of the target. In continental European
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cultures, East Asian cultures, and English speaking cultures, the tendency to view an
individual with possessing a greater perceived consistency is found predominantly in the
English speaking cultures (Kashima et al., 2005). When assessing the perceived agency,
those individuals within the English speaking cultures find the individual to have the
most naturally attributed thoughts, intentions, yet for perceived inalterability, the culture
does not appear to show a strong correlation, nor does perceived inalterability when
considering the culture of the actors. This is thought to propose the individual is more
essentialized than that of a group (Kashima et al., 2005).
Essentialism and Racial Categorization
Although not widely researched, the link between racial essentialism and racial
categorization has been identified as an emerging neuroscience of culture and as an
emerging field in social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, cultural psychology, and
essentialism driven behaviors (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Rule, Freeman, & Ahbad,
2013). However, racial categorization includes important psychological aspects and
racialized perceptions (Chao et al., 2013) and is being researched and explored more at
the present time.
In one study, Chao (2000) investigated the individual’s tendency and willingness
to categorize others as racially distinct through racial categorization, as one influencing
several psychological aspects of race-based categorization (Chao et al., 2013). Haslam
(2011) discussed the essentialist way of cognitive processing had, and will, have negative
implications for social behaviors as well as social attitudes. The researchers proposed this
theory following a path analysis being conducted using the structural equation modeling
(SEM) measuring essentialist beliefs. Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, and Tip (2013) used
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equation modeling software (EQS). This software specifically targeted to predict both
perceived possibility of culture adoption by immigrants who serve as the minority and the
level of identity threat the majority group participants experienced. Following the
measurement, the results indicated those with essentialist beliefs had a significantly
indirect effect for the “demand of culture adoption” (Zagefka et al., 2013, p. 63).
Additionally, the SEM analysis indicated those with essentialist beliefs were
simultaneously associated with negative perceptions about the possibility the outgroup
members could eventually culturally adapt (Zagefka et al., 2013).
The results of the path analysis indicated, according to Pereira et al. (2010), the
majority group member desired the minority population to accomplish the impossible
which was directly correlated with prejudice. Essentialism is thought to further encourage
inequality in both social and political power of one group over another (Pereira et al.,
2010). These recent assessment tools have assisted in the current research on the
epistemic process of essentialism and the measurement of its functioning.
The hypocedent to racial classification begins as early as childhood when children
whose parents are from differing racial groups are assigned to one racial group
considered as subordinate (Chao et al., 2013). This has been suggested as making the
hypocedent to racial classification harmful. Chao et al. (2013) and Brunsma (2006)
argued racial categorization has been shown to have significant social implications dating
back to the day of slavery and requires constant consideration in social psychology today.
Essentialism and Stereotyping and Prejudice
Prejudice is largely defined as a negative attitude toward an outgroup or the
individual outgroup members (Blincoe & Harris, 2009). Conger, Dygdon, and Rolleck
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(2011) additionally described prejudice as a phenomenon in which society has addressed
however interpersonal and race-based prejudice continues to exist. Furthermore, Conger,
Dygdon, and Rolleck (2012) presented discrimination as a continuum in the employment
arena, education, and housing front regardless of the current efforts of society to address
these issues. Although strides have been made, the group-based solutions have not
addressed the effects of racism and how to tackle the psychological aspects of adopting
ways to look at the neuropsychological and cognitive aspects of this occurrence.
When addressing perceived group homogeneity, epistemic processes,
stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and discriminatory tendencies, there has been
distinguished an important association between the belief in social determination (BSD)
theory and socio-cognitive concepts (Rangel & Keller, 2011). As early as childhood,
Gelman and Wellman (1991) proposed the individual has a propensity for forming a
“basic cognitive disposition” (p. 220) toward psychological essentialism. Essentialist
beliefs, in which the individual believes in underlying social category “essences” being
drawn upon in an attempt to assist in explain and rectifying sociocultural inequities is an
important phenomenon (Keller, 2005).
In previous research the essentialist cognitive process has been shown to be
present in children who have a firm understanding of the essences of others, and the
distinction of those who are felt to be in-group and outgroup members. This epistemic
processes are also known to reinforce the hypocedent principle that serves to reinforce
white privilege (Chao et al., 2013).
The process of essentialism is one which is correlated with problematic social
relations and includes the notion that cognitive essentialism deepens the social divide and
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promotes social segregation (Haslam, 2011). Dar-Nimrod and Heine (2011) addressed the
“broad implication” that cognitive essentialism has on understanding simple human
diversity. Finding cognitive essentialism leads to the notion the individual’s epistemic
process of essentialism warrants further review as it relates to being a catalyst to race
relations.
Essentialist processing allows the individual to “attach” social distinctions, which
may result in forms of prejudice and discrimination (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011).
Further, Haslam (2011) suggested this type of essentialism is not only included when
considering racial differences, but also when considering those who have mental
disorders, gender differences, and sexuality differences.
Although the empirical findings regarding the correlation between essentialist
beliefs and prejudice are mixed, in 1954, researchers such as Allport speculated the
individual with a prejudiced personality believed in an in-group essence which is a
fundamental part of the prejudiced attitude. Additionally, the essentialist group
justification is often the pre-cursor to outgroup as well as in-group hostility and conflict
(Yzerbyt et al., 2004). In addition to the Keller (2005) research, a significant number of
empirical studies have shown the individual who holds essentialist conceptions are more
likely to endorse racial stereotypes, “misremember” minority group members through
stereotypical notions, and many times, show less interest or concern in interacting with
those from racial outgroups (Eberhardt, Dasgupta, & Banaszynski, 2003; Plaks,
Stroessner, Dwek, & Sherman, 2001; Keller, 2005).
When addressing the individual who endorse the color-blind theory, it is known
the person will believe an individual’s race should not be emphasized due to the
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enhancement of group membership categorization, therefore reducing the individual’s
feeling of the need to “get to know” the individual as opposed to basing judgment upon
the presented race. However, since the perception of the color-blind theory, social
psychologists have been taking note of the backlash secondary to those individuals of
color reporting feelings of being negated and dismissed as an entity (Rosenthal and Levy,
2012).
Belief in Essentialist Social Determination
Differentiation between the acceptance and judging behaviors, both in the ingroup and outgroup scenario is described as a combined function of perceived similarity
of the members. This is known to take place during the processing of outgroups as well
as members who are considered to possess similar traits. This is accomplished by
assigning the group members a category prototype. This assumption invites concern in
that a group is confined to a perceived rational and moral social categorical
representation. This categorical representation many times will result in a conflict of
liberal norms and the injunction of generalization (Condor, 2006).
Yrzebyt et al. (2007) underscored the subjective essentialist behaviors and beliefs
are not always based upon the biological features of another, but also include the
individual taking into consideration the factors that profoundly and permanently shape a
person. This lay theory, referred to as BSD, introduced the possibility the individual’s
personal characteristics are shaped by the “outside” person as they relate to an
“immediate situation” (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Socially constructed thought processes
such as these are known to play a part in the malleability of the essentialist’s processes.
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This is also observed when an individual attributes behaviors based upon social influence
in societal and economic contexts (Rangel & Keller, 2011).
Investigating the individual’s tendency toward the BSD is known as the
individual believing a person’s fundamental social character is shaped by social factors
such as peer contact, upbringing, and socialization. Additionally, it is considered to
constitute the belief that others personal essence is socially determined. This component
of essentialist thinking is utilized by attaching ideological and epistemic processing, and
in turn is involved in the tendency to stereotype others (Rangel & Keller, 2011). No et al.
(2008) considered the belief in the social construction of race such as BSD suggests,
implies race is an artificial grouping and is easily changed.
The BSD is specific to the perception of group characterization based upon social
features and results in group homogeneity. This process then assists the individual in
providing final and unambiguous answers (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Additionally, BSD
offers the justification to the group’s status in social hierarchy. The person with the belief
of group homogeneity of social groups has a centralized belief pattern in which the
specific social group is considered to have a common essence and underlying nature both
leading to essentialism (Haslam et al., 2000; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997).
This lay theory is considered as one that can be related to social hierarchy and
ideological constructs. These constructs enhance the viewed differences in individuals,
groups, nations, and social dominance orientation (Rangel & Keller, 2011). Young,
Sanchez, and Wilton (2013) argued that it is imperative to test the conditions that are
indicative of essentialist thinking, and how and why they persist, as well as why
essentialist thinking is particularly strong and relevant among high status groups.
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Belief in Genetic Determinism
An additional lay theory in essentialist perception is the belief of genetic
determination (BGD). Addressing a less complex structure than that of BSD, BGD
focuses upon a strong endorsement of attentional focus being on the biological and
genetic origins and how they make up a person’s character. Both the BGD and BSD are
considered as important contributors to the study of essentialist processing and sociocognitive concepts, however, BGD is also considered a component in the perception of
social group homogeneity (Rangel & Keller, 2011).
When investigating the role of “perceived” intelligence, the drive for success, and
violence, it is known those who make more genetic attributions to an individual’s
character score higher when measuring traditional racism as well as modern or aversive
racism. Additionally, noted is specifically the Asian-American population. AsianAmericans who held the belief that genetic essentialism is true, are more likely to find it
increasingly difficult to relate to both Asian and American cultures in turn increasing the
ambiguity of messages processed by both groups (Chao, Chen, Roisman, & Hong 2007;
Jayatene et al., 2006, 2009).
Function of Lay Theories and Essentialism
Serving as a catalyst in socio-cognitive motives, essentialist thinking is known to
assist in the explanation and justification of others behaviors and essence. Yzerbyt et al.
(1997) argued this in part, would endorse stereotypes as well as justify the treatment of
outgroup members and assist the individual in rationalizing social inequities. Referred to
as “fundamental beliefs”, this process serves three individual socio-cognitive needs (Jost,
Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). The first is essentialist thinking, in which the
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person is provided epistemic motives in which the desire for definitive answers is
presented. Additionally, the person’s ideological motives are met. These include assisting
in justifying social inequalities. And lastly, the existential motives, referring to the
person’s desire to buffer any perceived threat to self. The reliance upon lay theories to
explain racial differences is thought to enhance stereotyping and in turn lead to increased
out-group judgments.
Consequences of Lay Theories and Essentialism
The lay theories of essentialist processing serve as a suppression-justification
model of prejudice. The process endorses prejudice by those who are highly motivated to
justify others and any ambiguous information. Additionally, this permits the expression
of prejudiced attitudes as well as the expression of prejudiced attitudes, leading to the
individuals believing they have authenticated negative reactions toward other social
groups (Crandal & Eshleman, 2003).
Proposing the essentialist lay beliefs serve as status-preserving beliefs, Rangel
and Keller (2011) highlighted the negative attributes associated with social groups and
those who endorsed the lay theories of essentialism. It’s suggested the endorsement of
these theories could be the reaction secondary to the prejudiced attitude and the person’s
need to justify the activism of such attitudes.
Entitativity
Entitativity is described as being an epistemic process in which a collection of
individuals are considered as being together and form a coherent group (Clark &
Wegener, 2009). First introduced by Campbell (1958), the term refers to the nature of and
entity which has a real and present existence. Entitative groups represent a singular unit
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as compared to group who are perceived as less coherent. Perceived knowledge about the
target group is shown to result in an increase in effort needed in the processing of new or
different information gleaned about the group (Clark & Wegener, 2009). Entitativity,
when considered as generalized beliefs, is known to be closely related to the act of
stereotyping.
The conceptualization and estimates of probability of an individual possessing
particular attributes, due to belonging to a group, or entitativity, is analogous to the
individual attempting to identify a normative standard. In studies investigating social
judgments and subjective probability, the individual’s judgment is shown to be based
upon one of three categories in the Bayes’ theorem which offers the normative standard
for all social judgments. One category in the Bayes’ theorem suggests the conservative
individual will give individualized information too little attention while entertaining a
significant amount of influence from prior probabilities (Rasinski, Crocker, & Hastie,
1985).
Social entities on a wide scale are known to mirror the perception of “imagined
communities”. While considering the Gestalt approach to social entitativity this perceived
similarity is one of four separate components, which include factors that enhance the
perception of group entitativity. Included are the perception of the group having a
common fate, salience, boundedness, and similarity, and the most important being the
individual’s perception of entitativity leading to the belief in a common fate of group
members (Campbell, 1958).
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In-Group and Outgroup Entitativity
Perceived group entitativity is described as the degree a group is perceived as a
homogenous unit and is known as an important precursor when considering inter-group,
in-group, and outgroup perceptions and stereotypical thoughts (Yzerbyt et al., 2004).
Several empirical studies show the individual with negative attitudes or extreme opinions
about an outgroup are significantly more entitative than those who are not (Grzesiak,
Feldman, & Suszek, 2008). In addition to these findings, Whildschut, Insko, and Pinter
(2004) argued the perception of groups considered as entitative may lead to significant
negative impressions and distrust of outgroups. Additionally, the phenomena coined
“collective retribution” by Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, and Ames (2006) is
thought to be the result of judging a group as an entitative group as well (Phelps,
Ommundsen, Turken, and Ulleberg, 2012).
Entitativity is indicated as being significant in the perceiver’s beliefs of group
similarity. A group whose members look the same, are perceived as thinking and acting
the same, thereby considered a highly entitative unit. This unit is then assumed as one
having many similarities (Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010).
Entitativity ratings are found to be higher dependent upon how often group members
interacted, according to research performed by Crump et al. (2010). When investigating
similarity among group members, this same study indicated entitativity ratings are subject
to more strongly predicted significance when information about the similarity of the
group members was presented (Crump et al., 2010).
In congruence with this research when utilizing Campbell’s (1958) four
dimensional categories to test the level of entitativity of the group members it is shown
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that in-group influences affect the level of the identification within the group as well
(Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003). The individual will use epistemic entitativity
by using the degree of similarity within the group, the situational salience of the in-group,
the clarity of boundaries, and the degree of similarity within the group to base judgments
upon (Castona et al., 2003).
When considering in-group behaviors and EEE processing, the individual
considers their own group as being highly entitative. These group members will in turn
exclude group members who may deviate from the perceived group norms. This may be
considered as a motivation in the freezing of the EEE processes. These findings might
lead to the expectation that in-groups may be considered in more entitative terms and
outgroups be considered in a more homogenous manner (Crump et al., 2010).
The effects of valuation and devaluation in the individual’s goal-congruent
activities are known to be more valued and epistemically sought while goal-incongruent
activities are devalued. This occurs within group members as it does with outgroup
perception. These processes are shown to be in line with the epistemic process of NFC
and a preference for group homogeneity or entitativity (Lalwain, 2009).
Perceived group homogeneity lends itself well to the individual’s preference for
predictability and certainty, both thought to be pre-cursors to the NFC (Fox & ElrazShapira, 2005; Roets & Van Hiel, 2010). Group level information and the perception of
group homogeneity is shown to be in those individuals with a high NFC (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2010). Entitativity, as presented by Ableson, Dasgupta, Park and Banaji (1998) may
be identified as an agency described as the individual who perceives a social being as
being agentic. Agentic social beings, those who exhibit actions toward a common goal
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and consist of differentiated yet interacting parts, are considered entitative. The
individual who epistemically processes to the extent in which an entity is as one, and
which consists of differentiated parts that are entirely interdependent upon each other is
considered agentic (Lickel et al., 2000). When the agentic individual has previously
examined the entitativity of either in-group or outgroup members, the process entails the
recognition of the group as a whole as opposed to individuals.
Groups may present as those that vary along a continuum of entitativity, with
some that are perceived by others as having a higher propensity for entitativity than
others. Groups with a high level of entitativity are also perceived differently than groups
with a low level as noted by extensive research. Groups with members that are perceived
to all look the same, as well as behave the same, and think the same, are more likely to be
considered a highly entitative unit (Crump et al., 2010).
An individual’s motive for social identification may elicit stronger levels of
entititativity to reduce the individual’s uncertainty. Because the individual is in constant
search for symmetry when faced with both assimilation and differentiation, group
members may find a greater bond with those with which they feel assimilated. This
feeling of assimilation further raises the level of perceiving an increased differentiation of
others who are perceived as being different. This may be considered an additional precursor to the freezing of the EEE processes (Brewer & Roccas, 2001).
A person with high levels of entitativity is known to make exacting and harsh
evaluations of those thought to be negative group members. Those that have a higher
level of perceived entitativity are argued to possess a higher social identity value. The
outgroup member that is perceived as being a stand-out outsider, or “black-sheep” and
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are members of a highly considered entitative group are found to pose a more serious
threat than even those from groups considered more inconsequential (Lewis & Sherman,
2010).
Perceived Agency and Entitativity
Perceived agency occurs when a social being is recognized as having mental
states which include intentions and beliefs. Those who hold theories of agency will, when
referring to an individual or group, consider this group as one with intentionality and
autonomy. When utilizing group agency, the group is thought to be as one and is
responsible for its action. Perceived agency, as it refers to expectations about shared
group intentions and goals is found to increase perceived entitativity by the extent to
which the perceiver attributes dispositional tendencies (Morris, Menon, & Ames, 2001;
Welbourne, 1999). When a group is thought to be entitative, one member can be
considered responsible for another member’s actions therefore suggesting a conceptual
association between agency and entitativity (Likel, Schmader & Hamilton, 2003).
In 2000, Lickel et al. provided empirical evidence suggesting essentialism and
agency depict the interrelated aspects of the individual’s perceptions of social objects as
true entities. This evidence followed a study in which the judgments of collections of
people were examined as a perceived entitativity. The results indicated the extent to
which social entities were thought to have a shared goal was strongly correlated as were a
common outcome and frequent interactions with other members. Additionally, this same
study provided evidence of perceived similarity and un-alterability although the
correlation was smaller than those implicating assumed common goal and fate as with
agency.
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Entitativity, Stereotyping, and Prejudice
In highly entitative groups the individual traits that are abstracted are associated
with the group, as well as the members of the group, thus providing a stereotype. When
the perceiver has processed the stereotype, the group is continued to be processed as a
whole as opposed to individual members (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002). When
highly entitative groups are cognitively processed, the perceiver develops considerations
beyond the characteristics of individual group members. This, and additional associations
provide for a more difficult time recollecting any specific information about the
individual group member. Groups who have a high level of entitativity are considered as
being those who are more associated with an increased number of prototypic
representations.
Demonstrated by Welbourne, Harasty, and Brewer (1997) entitativity may
reconcile the association between the group members being stereotyped and the more
generalized opinions of the individual group members as being whole representatives of
the group. The intensity of the relationship between stereotyping and generalizations
depends upon the strength of the expectancy the individual holds regarding the stereotype
(Stangor & McMillan, 1992). This takes place in addition to assessing the motivation the
individual must have in an attempt to form simple and coherent impressions of the group
(Crawford et al., 2002).
The individual with perceived entitativity will be positively correlated with the
expectancy strength of a group as well as stereotyping (Brewer & Harnisty, 1997). When
considering the groups expectancies, this finding is important in that it shows the
individual group member is more likely to be evaluated in terms of the expectancies of
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others and those expectancies are based upon the group dynamic when the group is
considered highly entitative. In turn, this group is seen as one in which increased
stereotyping behaviors are in tandem with an increased level of assimilation of the
individual as compared to the group stereotype (Hilton & Hipple, 1990).
Yzerbyt and Schadron (1994) argued that one of the most pertinent aspects to
entitativity and prejudice was the suggestion the stereotype was not only descriptive of
social groups but also the explanation of the group which one might consider to be their
essence. Researching the relevance between entitativity and stereotyping, an important
question to be answered is assessing when the individual is perceived as a member of a
group and when they are perceived as an individual. This is done in an attempt to identify
how both individual and group-relevant information affects the individual’s impression of
others (Crawford et al., 2012). This will provide additional information as to when the
individual processes only to the point of behavioral-trait association further encouraging
the freezing of the EEE processes (Crawford et al., 2012).
When a group is considered in the context of a contrasting entity, the perceived
information is known to motivate the formation of a stereotype and in turn, results in the
formation of the maximal differentiation between the two. This has been shown to occur
even when the group in question is not considered as one that is highly entitative
(Crawford et al., 2012). The information the individual processes traits will stop at a level
of individual trait inference when processing information about members from a low
entitative group. When the trait of another has been abstracted from their behavior the
supplementary links to the given group and its members are not completed (Crawford et
al., 2002).
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Individual traits are associated with groups as whole entities when considering the
process of stereotyping and traits. Crawford et al. (2002) demonstrated this when noting
an individual who cognitively processes behaviors performed by members of a highly
entitative group, processes the traits of others as those that become associated with the
individuals within the group. Based upon a continuum or “in-line” group impressions, as
opposed to individual members, these epistemic processes provide for an increasingly
high association with the direct members of the group.
Those with underlying explanations for stereotypes, as described by Crawford et
al. (2002), identify substantially with highly entitative groups or those with highly
entitative characteristics. Groups who are highly entitative are known to perceive ingroup members as those who are more effective in supporting a similar agenda in order to
fulfill personal needs. The in-group members are in turn protected by others in an attempt
to guard against perceived external threats (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2014). Social
psychological research indicates the phenomena of stereotyping and prejudice between
inter-groups might benefit from a closer examination of the entitative processes.
Relatively few research studies have been dedicated to the exploration of the individual’s
beliefs and subsequent influence upon judgment of groups as a whole entity (Dasgupta,
Banaji, & Abelson, 1999).
Groups with an increased entitativity level are more apt to glean an in-group
strategy which leads to discrimination and the member maximizing the differences
between the in-group and the outgroup. This leads to increased discrimination as a result
of the member utilizing maximum effort to gain in-group profits. As a result, high
entitativity groups are found to be less cooperative with outgroup members and
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demonstrate little concern with equality and joint efforts to improve an outcome. This
also leads to the perception that outgroups are more harmful and easily produce more
negative attitudes (Moscatelli & Rubini, 2013) in the individual perceiver.
Entitativity is reflected as a reference to the psychological cohesiveness in social
groups when salient cues of perception are presented. This can include both physical and
special similarity. Additionally, it is expected individuals who share membership in a
particular racial group are also considered to share similar race-related characteristics
(Campbell, 1958). Minority groups are considered to be highly entitative. As
demonstrated by Dasgupta et al. (1999), individuals belonging to non-entitative groups
are more likely to be individualized by out-group members, more so than those from
highly entitative groups.
Social groups who appear to be interconnected and unified are less likely to be
considered by perceivers as having individual differences and are more apt to focus upon
the groups invariant similarities. Furthermore, the influence of perceived group
entitativity encourages the notion the groups may engage in aggressive and harmful
actions against members of outgroups. The understanding of the malleability of the EEE
processes and the development of stereotypes in particular is an important topic when
investigating individuals who are presented with new or unfamiliar social groups
(Dasgupta et al., 1999).
Social groups who resemble each other are expected to have shared characteristics
which are invariable. These beliefs are ones that play an important role in both the
development of new stereotypes in which perceivers will search for a typical member to
assist in the explanation to not include the members as those who are perceived as
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atypical (Dasgupta et al., 1999). Salient physical properties, provide the individual with
the tools thought needed in order to develop stereotypical mind sets that have been
amenable to salient physical properties. These physical properties are shown to relate to
the assumption of psychological assimilations as well (Dasgupta et al., 1999). This
argument is in tandem with Campbell’s (1958) presentation suggesting that physical
similarities might be considered as overt manifestations of the underlying psychological
nature of the group. The creation of stereotypes may be related to the perceiver
attempting to derive their beliefs from observable features and characteristics of the
group. Cognitive associations, between both physical and psychologically assumed
characteristics may present additional justification of the individual’s freezing of the EEE
processes in the individual’s attempt to protect and guard against newly presented
information.
The development of prejudice with regards to outgroups was demonstrated by
Dasptuga et al. (1999) as being accurate for entitative groups and are considered as being
those that are “active agents” poised to engage in harmful judgments and actions against
outsiders. These findings are parallel with the Campbell’s (1958) argument that even
when group-relevant knowledge is absent, when an out-group members are considered
similar, the perceived purposeful organisms can appear as threatening to those observing
from outside of the group. This phenomenon has been extensively researched since the
original postulation by Campbell (1958) and numerous researchers have demonstrated
that group interactions are interspersed with distrust and competition (Dasgupta et al.,
1999). Inter-group relations and the entitative process continue to be researched in an
attempt to understand and reduce stereotyping and prejudice.
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Entitativity, Essentialism, Stereotypes, and Prejudice
Yzerbyt et al. (1997) proposed two factors that reinforce each other in the
individual’s perception of groups. These factors include the level of organization and
similarity of the group, also known as entitativity and the essence of the group which
references the perceived and detected similarities, also referred to as essentialism. Well
documented are the reactions of an individual and their subsequent EE behaviors toward
not only their in-group but outgroups as well. The entitativity of a social group is found
to encourage the perceiver to conjure an underlying essence for others, thus providing an
account for the individual’s observed regularities and irregularities.
This process could inspire the perceiver to induce a causal essence in which the
group is viewed as that in which observed regularities are noted. Another view is the
designation of the deep characteristics viewed to be possessed by a social group are likely
to reinforce the individual’s search for organization and similarities and therefore result
in the individual construing the group as an entity (Yzerbt, Corneille, & Estrada, 2001).
When considering the role of entitativity and information processing and
behaviors, researchers have explored multiple copulations of the intertwined processes of
social perceptions (Dasgupta et al., 1999; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998; Yzerbyt,
Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998). As early as 1996,
Hamilton and Sherman demonstrated the individual perceiver will engage in observable
differing mental operations dependent upon the assumed entativity of the encountered
target. These findings, in part, are analogous with the concept of essentialism as a whole.
The theory based concept of essentialism according to Murphy and Medin (1985)
and Medin and Ortny (1989) often refers to the layperson’s belief that many categories
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possess essences. The perceiver often utilizes concepts that are grounded in essentialist
implicit theories. More recent research indicates this to be the case in lay people holding
essentialist theories living things, but not about the human itself. Essentialism, as it
relates to social categories, for example, Italians, Jews, or a group at a sporting event
(Murphy & Medin, 1985; Medin & Ortny, 1989) others are often treated as those of a
“natural” type of group and the notion of the true essence. In turn, it is rare for the
individual to process the group members as individual artifacts. This social categorization
is viewed as a consequence of the individual’s established needs, desires, and
conventions when based upon the concept of essentialism (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992).
When allowing for the notion of entitativity and essentialism it’s important to
contemplate the connection between the two processes. Entitativity as defined by
Campbell (1958) was described as the degree to which an individual has the ability to
consider the nature of an entity as one having a real existence. This notion was explored
by Yzerbyt et al. (1997) and was referred to as the impact of numerous group properties
regarding the individual’s judgment of entitativity. The distinction between entitativity
and essentialism within the perception of group’s domains has been shown as having
reminiscent characteristics of other distinctions in social psychology. Subjective
essentialism indicates the stereotype, in addition to being considered as a convenient
means to facilitating the individual’s dealing with a confusing environment, also serves
the individual by providing an important subjective meaning to the surrounding world
(Oaks, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Yzerbyt et al., 1997).
Stereotypes are known to function as the individual’s enlightening due to their
perception of the stereotype supplying them with additional information to be added to
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the existing set of interrelated information that has already been possessed. These
stereotypes, being perceived as interconnected information, assist the individual in
compiling a more complete list of attributes that in turn is perceived as assisting in the
more thorough description of a social group (Yzerbyt et al., 2001).
Additionally, these cues can encompass the basis for the individual’s
understanding of the relationships among the group member’s attributes. Yzerbyt et al.
(2001) argued the linking of not only observable features but the individual’s deeply
inherent characteristics are involved. This association may assist in the justification and
understanding of an individual’s aptness to steer towards making social arrangements
based upon the representation of social divisions.
Neuroscience and Race Relations
Neuroscience and culture is an evolving field of research in which cultural
differences and behavior are investigated as they relate to neural activity and circuitry.
The method of neuroscience is especially important when considering social perception
(Mason & Morris, 2010) Social scientists have long depended upon the investigation of
galvanic skin response or non-specific brain activity via the use of the
electroencephalogram (Aragona, Kotzalidis, & Puzella, 2013). Important to this research
is the inclusion of the neural processes, as they relate to the individual’s EEE processes.
In an attempt to provide the answers to questions and problems entailing the processes of
behavior, brain functions, and race, Kubota, Banaji, and Phelps (2012) and Rule et al.
(2013) investigated and reviewed the capacity of cultural neuroscience, the insights, and
breakthroughs of past and current research.
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The benefits of understanding neuroscience as it relates to race can be seen by
observing both the plasticity and capacity for the individual’s ability to adapt. Rule et al.
(2013) claimed the brain can become static, in other words processes are known to freeze,
such as the EEE functions. Being considered the invention of the individual’s genes and
innate biological copulations, recent studies indicate the experience an individual has
and/or the exposure to such circumstance that they experience can be the pre-cursor to
both structural and functional changes in the brains design (Han & Northoff, 2008).
Human brain genes, and innate biological processes, are shown to be involved
with the individual’s experience and exposure to situations and are considered viable
instigators of functional situational changes within the brain (Han & Northoff, 2008; Rule
et al., 2012;). In a study conducted by Freeman, Rule, Adams, and Ambady (2009) the
individual was found to possess cognitive neuropsychological processes in which the
cultural dispositions of an individual influence both the behavior of the individual and the
brain function of that person. Found as well was evidence that American participants
were apt to endorse dominant values and in turn, behaviors would be exhibited in a more
dominant way. This was corroborated by Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) scans,
mirror neurons and electrophysiology, showing the involvement of the amygdala and the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Aragona, Kotzalidis, & Puzella, 2013; Kubota et al.,
2012).
The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is linked to the stimulation of assessing
others intentions through the use of reasoning about the out-group member’s intentions.
These tasks are assessed by the perceiver in an attempt to explain the others motive and
hidden intentions. Additionally, when analyzing the assessment of another’s mental state,
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the mPFC has been linked to inferences about the out-group member’s traits and
dispositions. Involved in the EEE processes the mPFC is among the neural activation
centers which is implicated as a strategy mechanism when consciously interpreting others
mental states and disposition through attribution (Mason & Morris, 2010).
The amygdala and its connections to the cortex is the area of the brain that is
considered the region most affected when related to race attitudes and social decisionmaking. These areas are also affected during the social processes of learning fear,
processing emotionally relevant stimuli, attention, and memory. Another region
frequently reported in neuroimaging studies of race is the ACC dorsal region of the brain.
This area monitors for the individual’s response and any response competition. If conflict
is noted the ACC will engage the person’s executive control (Botvinick, Braver, Barch,
Carter, & Cohen, 2001) allowing for the justification and reasoning of judgment.
The psychological model of brain systems and racial attitudes suggest there are
two stages involved when an individual processes racial stimuli. Neuroimaging indicates
the amygdala and the fusiform gyrus (FFA) are two such systems. The amygdala is
involved in the detection of racial stimuli and the evaluation of such as indicated by both
physiological responses and the implicit association assessment (IAT). Additionally,
shown is the FAA region quickly processing race information, especially in response to
in-group race faces, and the amygdala is linked to implicit race preference and judgments
of trust (Kubota et al., 2012).
Neural Activity and EEE Seizing
The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) in the brain is known to play an important
part in the individual epistemic essentialist entitativity and the seizing of perceived
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information. The ACC is described as being the alarm in which the need for conscious
analytic processing alerts the individual to perform further conscious analytic processing
(Mason & Morris, 2010). Additionally, the ACC is known to be sensitive to a variety of
perceived external conflict. Specifically, how an individual recognizes and processes the
need for deliberation. Cognitive neuroscientists have long studied the need of the
individual to engage in the controlled processing (Mason & Morris, 2010). This process,
the ACC, as argued by researchers may play an important role in both detecting conflict
as well as signaling the individual to proceed in a top-down method of control (Botvinick
et al., 2001).
When conflict is introduced, ACC activity is increased. This conflict may include
the perceiver as one who is experiencing various forms of conflict. For instance, this has
been noted when the individual’s expectations are somehow violated. This conflict will in
turn, be indicated by an increase in the blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) and signal
this region of the brain to increase the individual’s neuro processes when confronted with
ambiguous problems that lack obvious solutions. The need for an individual’s timely
deliberation is likely signaled by the need to prevent automatic processes from taking the
lead in the individual’s social sense making (Mason & Morris, 2010).
When detecting conflict or an inconsistency, the individual’s neurological process
of ACC will detect this encounter and signal the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to assist in
drawing more time in conscious deliberation. This process can also be related to the
individual’s NFC in an efficient and expedient manner relating back to the seizing of the
EEE processes. Believed to support executive functioning, that is described as a function
in which reasoning is a prevalent result, this process allows for the neural activation in
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which the individual will engage in conscious manipulation of information even when it’s
no longer present in the sensory environment (Mason & Morris, 2010).
When attempting to quickly assess incoming stimuli social neuroscientists tend to
agree when a behavior is considered ambiguous or inconsistent with a previously formed
schema the ACC alarms other neural activation centers. This alarm signals the perceiver
to use careful deliberation when attempting to decipher the meaning of the stimulus and
integrate additional information prior to forming causal judgment (Mason & Morris,
2010). However, in the seizing and freezing of the EEE processes, the individual may
make a conscious or unconscious effort to ignore these signals.
Amygdala Activation and Gender
Derntl et al. (2012) argued the processing of faces caused the stronger and more
sustained activation of the amygdala when processing outgroups. Findings between the
activation of this processing when referencing outgroups, as well as the differences in the
processing between genders, has been heterogeneous and inconsistent in the past.
However, when comparing two culture specific male and females, Derntl et al. (2012)
presented findings in which the Asian male, when processing male outgroup members
showed a significantly stronger bilateral amygdala and neural activation than that of
Caucasian males. Furthermore, Asian females responded similarly. This same result was
presented when comparing Caucasian genders, finding there was no significant gender
specific differences in amygdala and neuro activation, Derntl et al. (2012) do argue the
female from a western region shows greater amygdala activation when associated with
implicit emotional processing of out-group members. The two emotions showing the
most significant amount of neuro activations in these females were empathy and humor.
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However, these two emotions have not been shown to have a noteworthy correlation to
stereotyping and prejudice (Dasgupta et al., 2009).
Both females and males exhibit only slight differences in the lateralization in
amygdala activation. This difference might reflect differing cerebral strategies between
genders when processing emotions. This slight difference may then be manifested
through behavioral or functional outcomes. However, the male gender demonstrates a
significant correlation between amygdala activation to fearful stimuli. Although the
female gender also showed significant neuro activation, the data presented shows the
male gender dominating this activation (Derntl et al. 2009).
Culture and Neuroscience
Both cultural and cognitive psychologies are interdisciplinary fields. Mason and
Morris (2010) argued the consideration of culture when investigating behaviors through
neuroscience is important in that culture has been shown to permeate the individual’s
attributions and in turn will provide a more complete account of underlying cultural
differences. Furthermore, the inclusion of cultural neuroscience research may assist in the
better understanding of the EEE processes among groups.
Both cultural neuroscience and the EEE processes have encouraged the
consideration of the role of cultural functions in the individual’s brain, as well as its
development. This further investigation may begin to breed and contribute to the
relatively new field of cultural neuroscience. When considering cultural neuroscience as
well as cognitive neuroscience, it important to consider these as interdisciplinary fields.
Doing so will offer the researcher the two fields which create ties with both the
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background of the diverse fields, but also an enhanced understanding within both of these
heterogeneous fields.
Culture and ethnicity can both affect how the individual behaves as well as affect
how they view and interpret the world through attentional processes and cognitive
processing. For instance, the Westerner in particular those born and raised in the United
States are found to possess dominant thinking and behaviors that are positively reinforced
by assertive and skepticism of authority (Rule et al., 2013).
When exploring cross-cultural differences, the cognitive neuroscience methods of
investigation are presented as worthy additions to the social psychology approaches by
providing additional insight into revealing differences that have in the past gone
undetected when using traditional behavioral assessments (Mason & Morris, 2010). Brain
imaging and cognitive neuro-scientific measures will allow for the additional exploration
in the cognitive processing of individual’s EEE processing and may provide further
insight into the freezing of neurocognitive activation centers.
Summary and Conclusions
Studies of the EEE processes emphasize its functions as a proxy to the
individual’s cognitive processing of individuals and groups based upon perceived
similarities. Prior research has indicated the epistemic processes are a catalyst in
motivating the construction of perceived knowledge resulting in the individual’s act of
applying subjectivity to social reality (Kruglanski, 1989, 2004). In addition, these studies
draw attention to the individual’s tendency to engage in quick judgments based upon
perceived knowledge via the need for closure. Epistemically, the need for closure assists
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in providing a desirable outcome to ambiguous information in a quick and easy fashion,
thereby making any additional information as an inconvenience (Rangel & Keller, 2011).
The EEE processes are also known to possess a tendency for permanence through
the epistemic need to protect information through the act of freezing. This epistemic
freezing is done in an attempt to strengthen an individual’s current knowledge and protect
the epistemic process from receiving any further contradictory information (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011b). Recent studies indicate the relationship between brain systems and the
individual’s EEE processes (Mason & Morris, 2010; Rule, Freeman, & Ambady, 2013)
and introduce the importance of further investigation into the mechanisms involved with
the unfreezing of the EEE processes.
Furthermore, these studies have provided insight into how the individual calls
upon the EEE processes to assist in the judgment of outgroups, in particular racial
outgroups, as well as the outgroup members who are perceived to share unchangeable
characteristics based upon the receiver’s perception of the group as a whole. Little
research has been provided in the area of social cognitive neuroscience and social
psychological discipline into what, if anything, might be considered a facilitator in the
unfreezing of the EEE processes as well as act as an agent in the continued malleability
of the EEE processes. Chapter 3 will outline the quasi-experimental study design that was
chosen for this exploration including the rationale, population, sampling procedure, data
collection strategy, constructs, and threats to validity.
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Chapter 3: Research Method
This study adds to the body of research on the neurological processes of epistemic
essentialist entitativity (EEE) as they relate to racial relations and outgroup processing.
The purpose of this study was to assess the effectiveness of an 8-week multicultural
psychosocial educational course on outgroup behaviors, customs, and beliefs on the
malleability of the EEE processes. This chapter is a detailed description of the study’s
research design. The following topics are covered: the descriptors and setting from which
the sample was taken, the justification for the sample size, an explanation of the
instruments to be used, ethical considerations, data collection, and data analysis plans.
Research Design and Rationale
A quantitative study was appropriate to examine the cognitive state of the EEE
processes to measure any movement in the participants’ EEE processes. The data
obtained from the sample can be generalized to the population of interest. In keeping with
the essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact theory (Allport,
1954; Pettigrew, 1998), and cognitive need for closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), I
examined how cognitive EEE (dependent variable [DV]) may be affected by the
academic introduction to psychosocial differences, practices, and social norms of various
cultures. The cultural psychosocial differences, practices, and social norms were
introduced through the presentation of educational material in a standard one semester, 8week, multicultural psychosocial college course that served as the independent variable
(IV). I investigated whether participation in a psychosocial culturally rich educational
course curriculum promoted the unfreezing or malleability of the cognitive EEE
processes.
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To assess the effect of multicultural psychosocial information on the EEE
processes, I measured the depth of cognitive salience by way of unfreezing and
malleability prior to and following the introduction of the IV. The IV, an established
college course, followed the college-wide course outline of record in which the major
course objectives included the participants’ introduction to the history, contributions,
cultural patterns, and social customs of major ethnic groups in the United States.
Additionally, the participants taking the course examined the cultural impact of
socioeconomic class and the cultural influence on time and space orientation. This
course, offered by an accredited university, consisted of one meeting per week over an 8week term; each meeting lasted 2 hours and 50 minutes.
I employed a quasi-experimental nonequivalent groups design in an attempt to
answer the research questions. A quasi-experimental design was appropriate for this
study because although participants were randomly selected for the comparison group
from a list of undergraduate students, those participating in the course were not randomly
assigned (see Blanton & Jaccard, 2008). The participants who received the IV (the
multicultural psychosocial educational course) were those who willingly registered to
take the class for college credit.
The nonequivalent groups design was appropriate because participants in the
course and the comparison group were administered a pre- and posttest. The unfreezing
and malleability of the EEE processes, in which the individual becomes more aware of
the incompleteness of his or her internalized representations of another culture or
outgroup, as well as an increase, decrease, or stagnation of belief dimensions in
uniformity, inherent core dimensions of race, and informativeness (Roets & Van Hiel,
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2011b) served as the dependent variable (DV). The DV was measured using the
Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a).
Tadmor et al. (2012) showed the effect of multicultural experiences in enhancing
simple cognitive generalized motivation rather than more specific cognitive processing at
deeper levels, such as those related to the epistemic essentialist processes. Additionally,
Tadmor et al argued the individual shows a cognitive tendency to endorse stereotypes
through consistent and long-term exposure to cultural experiences. This same research
indicated the individual may become somewhat receptive to searching for additional new
material following this consistent exposure. However, studies have also shown that the
brief exposure to multicultural indicators has not been consistently correlated with
epistemic change (Tadmor et al., 2012).
Epistemic change has been demonstrated through the simple mentioning of a
name in which cultural and semantic attributes are present, as shown in a 2007 study by
Uhlmann and Cohen. Brief exposure to multicultural indicators, and epistemic change are
powerful enough to activate stereotypes thought to be secondary to the epistemic
essentialist entitativity processes becoming stagnant. This practice, frequently seen in
discriminatory hiring situations, has been shown by Ahmed (2010) to be consistent with
aversive racism and the freezing of the epistemic essentialist entitativity processes
regardless of the brief or long-term exposure to multicultural experiences.
This study contributed to previous research through the introduction of the
consistent culturally rich educational material, which in turn addressed the exploitation of
heuristics in metacognition. Addressing metacognition, as argued by Brinck and
Liljenfors (2013), allows for the examination of information and theory-based judgments,
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which are known to involve high degrees of consciousness and control. Additionally, as
noted by Conger et al. (2012), metacognition serves as the classical conditioning-based
explanation for adverse race-elicited emotions that have been noted in individuals when
racially relevant stimuli are introduced. Any exploitation of the heuristics of
metacognition have been addressed in this research with the consistent introduction of the
multicultural psychosocial educational material over the course of the study.
Methodology
A convenience sample of 67 college students who had not previously engaged in
or registered in a psychosocial multicultural course constituted the comparison group
(Group A); 67 participants who were registered in a multicultural psychosocial course
constituted the treatment group (Group B). After providing informed consent, both
groups were asked to complete the Essentialist Entitativity Scale (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011) prior to the start of the 8-week course. The participants in Group A were not
enrolled in a multicultural psychosocial educational course and had not taken this type of
course in the past. Group B comprised those students registered in an 8-week
multicultural psychosocial course. Following the 8-week course, both Group A and
Group B were asked to complete the Essentialist Entitativity Scale (Roets &Van Hiel,
2011) to assess any malleability in EEE processes. The data were analyzed using the IBM
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Version 21 (IBM SPSS -21).
Population
The population included 9,218 college students enrolled for the 2015-2016
academic year in the Northeast region of the statewide college. The population included
adult male and female students in their first, second, third, or fourth year. I obtained
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approval from Walden University’s institutional review board (IRB # 01-14-16-0397528)
and from the institution where participants were enrolled. The total sample consisted of
134 male and female college students age 18 years and older. The average enrollment in
this course had consistently been between 70 and 120 students per semester.
Sampling and Sampling Procedures
The comparison group (Group A) was recruited via a college-wide list of enrolled
students ages 18 years and older. The potential participants for Group B were contacted
via e-mail inviting their participation. The sampling criteria included students 18 years
and older who were enrolled in a multicultural psychosocial course or who had not
previously participated in such a course. Group A consisted of a convenience sample of
67 students who were not currently enrolled in and who had never taken a multicultural
psychosocial college course. Any student participants who took part in a previous
multicultural psychosocial educational course were excluded.
I conducted a G*Power analysis to determine the required number of participants
based upon an effect size of 0.5. This effect size was chosen to represent the effect or
significance of the multicultural psychosocial course on the participants’ posttest results.
An intermediate effect size of 0.5, a power of 0.80, and α = 0.05 resulted in a total sample
size of 102 participants, 51 in each group. When the G*Power analysis was conducted
based on an effect size of 0.5, power of .90, and α = 0.05, the total sample size was 134
participants. I knew that there were 67 students enrolled in the multicultural psychosocial
course for the semester in which data collection was to take place, so I chose this sample
size.
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The recruiting procedure for the comparison group consisted of accessing the list
of all students enrolled in the college following the approval of Walden’s IRB and the
institution’s IRB. The convenience sample of Group B included those students registered
for the multicultural psychosocial course. The demographic information collected was the
participant’s age, year in school, gender, and ethnicity. Class attendance and absences
were additionally noted throughout the study. A pretest was administered face to face via
paper and pen to both groups prior to the term start, and a posttest was administered at the
end of the term. Data were collected using the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; see Appendix B) to measure the participants’ level of EEE
beliefs.
In addition to the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs scale post-test, I asked Group B
participants to complete a debriefing document providing information regarding ethnic
and cultural support groups, volunteer opportunities with various cultures, and a list of
local resources catering to specific cultures and ethnicities. I included a questionnaire
inquiring as to whether the student experienced any significant interactions with members
of outgroups during the study and the number of class meetings attended during the 8week course.
Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
The IV was the 8-week multicultural psychosocial educational course that adheres
to the college’s course of record (COR; see Appendix A) as mandated by the state of
Indiana and the educational instruction accreditation body as well as the required
milestones that were addressed throughout course delivery. The educational material
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delivered was developed by course developers qualified under the Indiana state board of
education and certified course writers. The statewide approved core curriculum was
written as an introductory social science college course and included lecture and video
material encompassing multiple cultures, the customs within the cultures, as well as
culturally based variations in attitudes, values, language, and gestures. The course was
approved to be offered statewide at 32 campuses and was open to a student population of
approximately 200,000 students.
The course consisted of weekly, 2 hour and 50 minute sessions of exposure to
various cultures, interaction with others representing these cultures, lectures, and video
for a total of 8 weeks. The participants were assessed throughout the course on the
material presented. These assessments were a part of the multicultural psychosocial
course and were required by the college. These assessments were not included in this
study’s data analysis. A sample of content questions developed by Hays and Erford
(2014) is included in Appendix B. The data collected from the Essentialist Entitativity
Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a; Appendix B) were collected prior to the course
and after the course and were the only data analyzed for the purpose of assessing any
movement in the EEE processes.
Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale
The Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) was used to
measure participants’ current beliefs about racial groups and their homogeneity,
informativeness, and inherence on a 7-point Likert scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 7
(completely agree). Written permission was not needed to use this scale as indicated in
the PsycTESTS databank permissions stating the test and its contents may be reproduced
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and used for noncommercial research and educational purposes without seeking written
permission (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). I agreed to distribute the scale in a controlled
manner as mandated by the use of assessment permissions (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) and
only to the participants engaged in the study.
The scale was previously used by Roets and Van Hiel (2011a) in a study of
undergraduate and adult participants of Flemish descent and was developed based on the
three components of essentialist entitativity: uniformity, informativeness, and inherent
core of racial groups. The scale was loaded on a single factor and demonstrated
convergent validity when considering an alternative measure of essentialist entitativity
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). Additionally, divergent validity was indicated when
measuring entitativity beliefs considered not to be essence based, a form of essentialist
processing.
According to Roets and Van Hiel (2012), this scale was found to be significantly
related to racial prejudice and indicated a superior level of predictive value when
compared to other scales measuring essentialist entitativity. Internal consistency was
shown to be good and was demonstrated across the samples to which it was administered
as indicated by alphas of .78 to .85 (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Additionally, the scale
has been implemented in varying cultures in the United States (Haslam & Levy, 2006)
and Canada (Haqanee, Lou, & Lalonde, 2014).
Data Analysis Plan
I used IBM SPSS -21to conduct the statistical analysis. The data cleaning
consisted of repeatedly screening for any data abnormalities such as missing data or
patterns that may require further examination. All examination dates, duplication of

82

records, or inclusion of those in the comparison group who previously engaged in a
multicultural psychosocial educational course were carefully observed. I used IBM
SPSS-21 to screen the data via histograms and scatter plots, and double data entry was
done as an additional method of screening.
To measure the internal consistency to test for a unidimensional measure a
Cronbach’s alpha was conducted. There were no additional tests required to measure
unidimentionality; therefore, an exploratory factor analysis was not run. Lastly, the
means and standard deviations of the variables were conducted and ANCOVA
assumptions were confirmed (Schmider, Ziegler, Danay, Beyer, & Buhner, 2010). In
order to address the following research questions, I ran a repeated measures ANOVA.
Research Question 1: Is there a difference in the depth of cognitive salience
through the malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college
students who have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course
compared to those who have not?
H01: There is a difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who
have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those
who have not.
H02: There is no difference in the depth of cognitive salience through the
malleability of epistemic essentialist entitativity processing between college students who
have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those
who have not.
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Research Question 2: Is there a difference in the epistemic essentialist driven
depth of cognitive salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be
noted in the perception of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who
have in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who have not?
H12: There is a difference in the epistemic essentialist driven depth of cognitive
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a
multicultural psychosocial education course compared to those who have not.
Ha2: There is no difference in the epistemic essentialist driven depth of cognitive
salience through the malleability of the EEE processes that can be noted in the perception
of the psychosocial norm for race between college students who have participated in a
multicultural psychosocial education course compared to those who have not.
Threats to Validity
External Validity
A random selection of participants in the comparison group assisted in addressing
the external threat of any lack of generalization (Blanton & Jaccard, 2008). However, as
the participants engaging in the multicultural psychosocial course consisted of a
convenience sample, a concern with generalization was recognized. Additionally, the
interaction of personal factors or treatment effects, which describe the extent to which the
IV might differentially affect the participants, was considered an external threat to
validity.
The ecological threats to external validity to be considered included the
Hawthorne effect in which the extent of the extra attention provided to the participants
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during the 8-week course serving as the IV limits the generalization to situations when
the attention is not present (Chiesa & Hobbs, 2008). This possible threat was controlled
for by assuring the IV was presented in a uniform manner as outlined in the COR.
Internal Validity
To control for the internal threat of maturation and history, the participants were
asked to complete a debriefing document (see Appendix C) in which any historical events
or natural maturational changes were considered for possible future research. An example
question this debriefing document included was to inquire if during the 8 week research
period the participant personally encountered or engaged in any significant or noteworthy
interactions with an individual or group of individuals who they consider members of an
outgroup which may have affected their answers on the post-test. Additionally, the testing
and instrumentation threats was considered by removing any incomplete questionnaires.
Regression to the mean was addressed through the attention paid to extreme outliers on
the individual scores.
Construct Validity
The Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) measured
the construct of essentialist entitativity. In the development of this scale an exploratory
factor analysis indicated the structure of the essentialism construct measured with high
primary loadings. These loading ranged from .37 to .75 describing the 16.3% of variance
on the items reflecting inherence, uniformity, and informativeness. The items addressing
immutability, necessity, stability, and naturalness showed a variance of 8.63%. With this
high internal consistency being demonstrated, as well as the empirically distinguishable
findings, it was shown that racial essentialism consists of two broad dimensions
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demonstrating a powerful predictor of racism (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). These findings
assisted in decreasing the threat to construct validity.
Ethical Procedures
The agreements to gain access to participants were obtained from the Walden IRB
and the institution’s IRB. Prospective participants freely registered for the multicultural
psychosocial course. Prospective participants who registered for the course as well as
those in the comparison group were presented with an informed consent.
The multicultural psychosocial course consisted of weekly two- hour and 50minute classroom lectures, videos, and multicultural education as outline in the COR (see
Appendix A). Participants were informed of their legal rights in terms of understanding
the nature and purpose of the study, their rights to consent to participate, and their right to
retract from participation at any time during the study without fear of penalty,
consequence, or harm.
Both the comparison group participants and the participants in the class were
asked to use the last four numbers of their phone number to be noted on their pre- and
post-tests. This number was written on the informed consent and the participants were
asked to note this number on both their pre-and post-test to serve as their private
identification number. The informed consent forms were kept off-site in a locked file
cabinet separate from the pre- and post-tests for the duration of the study.
Data collected from pre- and post-tests were also stored off site in a locked file
cabinet. I was the only person with access to both the informed consent forms and data.
The data and the informed consents will be destroyed after being kept securely off-site
for five years. There were no issues related to conflict of interest or power differentials.
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Ethical concerns relating to data collection included early withdraw from the
course and poor attendance by the participants. To address these possibilities, the
participants were asked to follow the college policy of attendance, equaling class point
penalties for unexcused absences. The participants withdrawing early would have been
contacted via e-mail to inquire as to their possible continuing participation in the course
as would any student would be, in accordance with college-wide retention efforts.
Summary
A quasi-experimental design was implemented due to a non-randomized sample
of all participants. A non-equivalent group design was appropriate in that a pre- and posttest were administered to two groups of participants. These two groups consisted of a
comparison group and a group of college students who participated in a multicultural
psychosocial course. The curriculum of the class included an introduction to various
cultures and ethnic outgroups during an 8-week period of time as per the approved course
curriculum.
A convenience sample of the target population, college students 18 years and
older served as the participants, and encompassed two groups with 67 in each group for a
total sample size of 134. The sample of participants were those college students who
enrolled in the multicultural psychosocial course and the comparison group was
comprised of student participants recruited via a college-wide list of currently enrolled
students. The comparison group participants were invited to participate via an e-mail
invitation using the contact information provided within the enrolled student roster.
In order to address the research questions as to if the introduction of a
multicultural psychosocial educational course can be instrumental in the unfreezing or
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malleability of the EEE systems in those who participate and those who do not, I
examined the role of consistent multi-cultural education and experiences and how they
affect the EEE systems. The findings may have positive social change implications for
informing the potential use of consistent and required multicultural psychosocial course
throughout the educational grades of kindergarten through higher education.
Grounded in the essentialist theory of race (Chao et al., 2013), intergroup contact
theory (Allport, 1958; Pettigrew, 1998), and the NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), I
utilized the empirically sound Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011a) to discover if differences exist in EEE processing in and between students
participating in a multicultural psychosocial education course and those who did not. The
results are discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4: Results
The lack of movement or the stagnation of the EEE processes has been considered
a catalyst for the development of stereotypical assignments to members of outgroups
(Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Cognitive processing, as related to the epistemic
processes after the introduction of multicultural psychosocial educational material, had
not been adequately addressed in the literature. The purpose of this quantitative research
study was to investigate possible differences in the depth of cognitive beliefs about racial
groups through EEE processes in college students who participated in a multicultural
psychosocial course and those who did not. A nonequivalent control group design was
used to assess college students’ beliefs about racial groups before and after an 8-week
multicultural psychosocial course. Students who did not participate in the course served
as the comparison group.
The research questions and hypotheses addressed the possible difference in the
depth of cognitive beliefs about racial groups between college students who participated
in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to those who did not. This
chapter contains the data collection procedures including the timeframe for data
collection, participant recruitment, and response rate. Demographic information and
statistical findings are presented in tables to display the study’s results.
Data Collection
The potential participants were contacted via a school-wide invitation on
electronic boards/television screens located throughout the college campus for a period of
2 weeks prior to the next scheduled multicultural psychosocial course that began the
week of March 14, 2016 and continued through May 10, 2016. Additionally, I made a
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Blackboard invitation to students already registered in the multicultural psychosocial
educational course. Those registered in the course who chose to participate served as
Group B. Participants who were not registered to take the course served as the
comparison group (Group A). The participants responded to the invitation by attending
sessions in which they were asked to provide informed consent and complete a pretest.
There were no incentives offered.
Pretest data collection consisted of a face to face pretest administration of the 12item Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale developed by Roets and Van Hiel (2011a). The
pretest was administered from March 7, 2016 through March 11, 2016. All 134
participants indicated they had not previously participated in the multicultural
psychosocial educational course or in any other multicultural psychosocial course as a
college student.
The posttest reminders were displayed beginning the week prior to the final class.
These reminders were presented via monitors throughout campus and in the classroom
Blackboard venue. Both Group A and Group B were invited to one of three meeting
times in which they were asked to complete the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) posttest. The meeting times were offered on three different
days and in three different meeting rooms on campus between May 4, 2016 and May 9,
2016. Following the completion of the posttest, all participants were given a three
question questionnaire (see Appendix C) that addressed any possible adverse events
taking place during the testing period that might be considered as possible threats to
internal validity. No adverse events were reported by any participants in either Group A
or Group B. Additionally, all participants were given a participant resource list consisting
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of community cultural and ethnic support groups, volunteer opportunities within various
cultures, and culturally specific resources (see Appendix D).
There were no discrepancies in the data collection as presented in Chapter 3. After
each of the three meetings, the surveys, demographic information sheets, consent forms,
and poststudy questionnaires were transported in brown inner-office envelopes to a
locked file draw off site. All documents will remain in this secure location for 5 years.
There were no markings identifying participant information on the outside of the
envelopes. Each was marked with the envelope contents and Group A or Group B as
appropriate. The pre-and posttests were matched to each participant using the last four
numbers of his or her phone number.
Descriptive and Demographic Characteristics
Study participants consisted of 134 college students 18 years of age and older
enrolled in a community college in the Northeast United States. The descriptive and
demographic descriptive data were cleaned and all outliers were analyzed and corrected
where appropriate. A post-hoc power analysis was conducted based on the 134
participants and an effect size of 0.5, resulting in power of .89.
As shown in Table 1, the total participant sample included 52 male students
(38.8%) and 82 female students (61.2%). Table 2 shows the race the participant
idrntified with. A chi-square analysis revealed no significant differences in race between
participants in Group A and Group B.
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Table 1
Participant Gender Groups A and B
____________________________________________________________________________________
Gender
%
n
____________________________________________________________________________________
Male
38.8
52
Female

61.2

82

____________________________________________________________________________________

Table 2
Participant Race Groups A and B
______________________________________________________________________
Race
%
n
____________________________________________________________________________________
White
42.5
57
Black or African American

25.4

34

Hispanic or Latino

14.9

20

Asian

8.2

11

Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander

3.0

4

Two or More Races
6.0
8
____________________________________________________________________________________

Table 3 shows the participants (Group B) college grade level as well as the
comparison group’s (Group A) college grade level. A chi-square analysis revealed no
significant differences in the age of participants in Group A or Group B.
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Table 3
Participant Year in School Groups A and B
______________________________________________________________________
Year
%
n
____________________________________________________________________________________
Freshman
17.2
23
Sophomore

33.6

45

Junior

32.8

44

Senior

16.4

22

_____________________________________________________________________
The ethnic and gender demographics of the 67 participants in Group A, the
comparison group, are shown in Table 4. The mean age of the participants in Group A
was 29.9 years of age.
Table 4
Demographic Characteristics of Comparison Group (Group A)
______________________________________________________________________Ch
Caracteristic
n
%
____________________________________________________________________________________
Ethnicity
White
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
American Indian or Alaska Native
Two or More Races
Other

28
20
10
5
0
0
4
0

41.2
29.4
14.7
7.4
0
0
5.9
0

Gender
Male
29
42.6
Female
38
55.9
____________________________________________________________________________________
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Table 5
Year in School of Comparison Group (Group A)
Year in School
n
%
____________________________________________________________________________________
Freshman
11
16.2
Sophomore
22
32.4
Junior
22
32.4
Senior
12
17.6

______________________________________________________________________
Table 6 shows the ethnic and gender demographics of Group B participants. The
mean age of participants in Group B was 28.1 years old (SD = 8.7) compared to
participants in Group A, whose mean age was 29.2 years old (SD = 10.1).
Table 6
Demographic Characteristics of Course Participants (Group B)
______________________________________________________________________
Characteristic
n
%
____________________________________________________________________________________
Ethnicity
White
Black or African American
Hispanic or Latino
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
American Indian or Alaska Native
Two or More Races
Other

29
14
10
6
4
0
4
0

43.3
20.9
14.9
9.0
6.0
0
6
0

Gender
Male
Female

23
44

34.3
65.7

______________________________________________________________________
All races were not fully represented in both Group A and B as per the
demographic data of the state of Indiana and the United States census data (United States
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Census Bureau, 2010, 2014) as neither group included a participant of American Indian
or Alaska Native descent.
In the state of Indiana, as of 2014, the White population comprised 86.1%, which
was an increase from 2010 when 84.3% of the population identified as being White.
Those individuals identifying as Black or African American were 9.6% of the population.
This total was also an increase in the Black or African American population from 2010
when 9.1% of Indiana’s population identified as members of this race. American Indian
and Alaskan natives in Indiana totaled 0.4%, Asian members represented 2.0% of Indiana
residents, and Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander group members represented 0.1% of the
population in 2014. Indiana residents who identified as being two or more races
decreased in 2014 and totaled 1.9% of the state’s population. This was a decrease from
the 2010 census data when 2.0% of Indiana residents identified as being two or more
races (United States Census Bureau, 2014).
According to the United States Census Bureau (2010), the U.S. demographic
structure was estimated to consist of 76.3% of the population identifying as White and
13.7% as Black or African American. Additionally, the U.S population was represented
by 5.9% of Asian descent, 1.7% as American Indian or Alaska Native, and 0.4% Native
Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander. Those within the U.S. population identifying as two
or more races equaled 5.2%.
Multicultural Psychosocial Educational Course
The multicultural psychosocial course was administered over an 8-week period
consisting of weekly meetings lasting 2 hours and 50 minutes each. No adverse events
took place during the delivery of the course. All participants in Group B continued to
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participate in the course for the full 8-week period. There were no reports of adverse
events during or following the 8-week period, nor were there any environmental
influences noted by any participants in the poststudy questionnaire (see Appendix C).
Results
The hypotheses asserted that through the malleability of the EEE processes the
depth of cognitive salience and the perception of the psychosocial norm for race would
differ between college students who participated in a multicultural psychosocial course
and those who did not participate in the course. To test these hypotheses, an ANCOVA
was performed after the participants completed the EEE Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a)
before and after an 8-week multicultural psychosocial course in which 67 of the
participants (Group B) received psychosocial information and instruction regarding
multiple cultures and perceived outgroups. A comparison group of 67 participants (Group
A) was composed of college students who did not participate in the multicultural
psychosocial course. Following administration of the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs
Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) posttest all data were entered into IBM SPSS -21 for
analysis.
Results of an independent sample t-test showed that the mean score of the EEE
Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) between the comparison group (n = 67), Group A (M =
4.08, SD = 1.81) and participant group (n = 67), Group B (M = 4.02, SD = 1.88) was not
significant t (132) = .187, df = 132, p > .05.
A one-way ANCOVA was performed to examine any significant differences
between the two groups. The assumptions of an ANCOVA were met such that data were
collected from two independent groups and displayed homogeneity of variance.
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Additionally, for the IV, the relationship between the DV and the covariate was linear,
and the linear relationship was parallel, therefore satisfying the assumption of
homogeneity of regression. The covariate was independent of the treatment effects.
Internal consistency of the EEE scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) was analyzed using
Cronbach’s alpha with results indicating a reliability coefficient of .72. A 2 (group) x 2
(pre-post) multivariate ANCOVA was conducted. The multicultural psychosocial course
served as the IV and the post-test scores of the items contained in the Essentialist
Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a) served as the DV. As measured by
the Likert scale items, the level of the participant’s depth of cognitive salience and
cognitive beliefs as related to racial groups were noted (see Table 8).
Age was a covariate to control for participants’ life experiences. This covariate
was chosen based upon research that found level of individual entitativity is related to life
experience, group membership, and social identification (Brewer & Roccas, 2001; Crump
et al., 2010).
An ANCOVA was run to compare any malleability in the EEE processes as
measured by the EEE pre-test, between the comparison group (Group A) and the
participant group (Group B). The results revealed a significant difference, p <. 05
F(1,132) = 10.6, p = <.001. Additionally, the results indicated that the malleability or
movement in the EEE processes, as measured by the EEE post-test, for those in Group B
who participated in the multicultural psychosocial course (M = 47.5, SD = 3.73) was
statistically different than those in Group A who did not participate in the multicultural
psychosocial course (M = 47.7, SD = 5.32), as shown in Table 7. A Bonferroni test
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indicated that the adjusted means for Group A and Group B were 46.8 and 46.2,
respectively.
Table 7
Between Groups EEE Posttest Results
_____________________________________________________________________
Group
M
SD
n
___________________________________________________________________________________
Comparison Group A
Participation Group B

47.7
47.5

5.32
3.73

67
67

______________________________________________________________________
While continuing to control for the covariate, the age of the participants, an
ANCOVA was conducted on each the analysis of the post-test for each of the 12 items of
the Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). The differences
between the groups on all 12 scale items of the post-test were significant. (see Table 8).
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Table 8
Between Groups EEE Posttest Results by Item
______________________________________________________________________
EEE Scale
M
SD
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Item 1. Members of a racial group are usually very similar.
Group A
4.56
1.66
Group B
2.16
.863
Item 2. If you know to which racial group someone belongs, you know a lot about his/her personality
Group A
4.02
1.63
Group B
1.31
6.78
Item 3. Despite apparent differences between members of the same racial group, in essence they are the same.
Group A
4.40
1.75
Group B
2.01
.945
Item 4. Members of a racial group usually are identical in many respects.
Group A
4.07
1.77
Group B
1.95
.842
Item 5. Membership of a racial group largely determines someone’s identity.
Group A
3.68
1.66
Group B
2.85
1.36
*Item 6. Members of a racial group share only superficial attributes, but actually they are quite different.
Group A
3.67
1.77
Group B
5.55
.909
*Item 7. Members of a racial group usually differ a lot from each other.
Group A
3.25
1.51
Group B
5.44
.892
*Item 8. Knowing that someone belongs to a racial group, is not sufficient to judge a person.
Group A
4.74
1.52
Group B
6.62
.775
Item 9. Members of certain racial groups share a large number of underlying characteristics besides their superficial resemblances
or differences.
Group A
4.85
1.35
Group B
3.34
1.37
*Item 10. Members of a racial group often have not much in common.
Group A
3.07
1.25
Group B
4.23
1.14
*Item 11. Membership of a particular racial group says nothing about a specific person.
Group A
4.34
1.63
Group B
6.38
1.23
*Item 12. Members of certain racial groups are often very different although they might look similar at first glance.
Group A
3.70
1.64
Group B
5.86
.935
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Note. n = 67,for Group A and Group B. *Items 6,7,8,10, and 12 are reverse coded. .
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The test of between-subject effects in the one-way ANCOVA are displayed in
Table 9 for each of the 12 items in the post-test Essentialist Entitativity Beliefs Scale
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011a). These results indicated that for each of the 12 post-test items
there was a statistically significant difference between the groups. Please see Appendix B
for the scale items. This difference was noted in the results by item. The mean score of
Group B and the post-test item scores were significantly lower following participation in
the multicultural psychosocial course and significantly higher on those items that were
reverse coded. These results indicate movement or malleability of the EEE processes
following participation in a multicultural psychosocial educational course.
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Table 9
Between-Subject Effects of the EEE Posttest by Item
______________________________________________________________________
Source
SS
df
MS
F
ES
____________________________________________________________________________________
Item 1. Members of a racial group are usually very similar.
169.4

1

169.4

244.6

.65

Item 2. If you know to which racial group someone belongs, you know a lot about his/her personality.

171.3

1

171.3

188.0

.58

Item 3. Despite apparent differences between members of the same racial group, in essence they are the same.

137.1

1

137.1

179.9

.57

179.6

.58

24.3

.50

Item 4. Members of a racial group usually are identical in many aspects.

145.6

1

146.6

Item 5. Membership of a racial group largely determines someone’s identity.

28.1

1

28.1

*Item 6. Members of a racial group share only superficial attributes, but actually they are quite different.

63.4

1

63.4

87.1

.39

91.0

131.2

.50

*Item 7. Members of a racial group usually differ a lot from each other.

91.0

1

*Item 8. Knowing that someone belongs to a racial group, is not sufficient to judge a person.

53.8

1

53.8

70.1

.34

Item 9. Members of certain racial groups share a large number of underlying characteristics besides their superficial resemblances
or differences.

62.3

1

62.3

45.9

.26

37.8

35.2

.21

144.0

.52

*Item 10. Members of a racial group often have not much in common.

37.8

1

*Item 11. Membership of a particular racial group often have not much in common.

148.8

1

148.8

*Item 12. Members of certain racial groups are often very different although they might look similar at

first glance.

91.7
1
91.7
116.3
.47
__________________________________________________________________________________
Note. Items 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 12 are reverse coded.
*p < .01.
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Summary
The statistical analysis supported the research question asking if there is a
difference in the depth of cognitive salience regarding racial groups and if there is a
difference in the perception of the psychosocial norm for race between college students
who have participated in a multicultural psychosocial educational course compared to
those who have not. Each group differed significantly on all items with item 10 on the
EEE scale, “Members of a racial group often have not much in common” (Roets & Van
Hiel, 2011b) showing the greatest statistical difference between groups following the 8week period, F (1,2) = 35.2, p = < .001.
When noting the effect size for each post-test item between groups, the difference
in the item answers within the total sample varied. The pre-test and post-test answers on
item 1 showed the largest mean difference of approximately 65%. Item 1 asked if the
participant considered members of racial groups to be very similar (Roets & Van Hiel,
2011b). The least amount of variance in the pre-test and post-tests answers, although it
may be considered moderate, was an approximate 21% difference in the mean score for
the item which asked the participants their belief that members of racial groups often
times do not have much in common (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b).
When asked their thoughts regarding the belief that members of racial groups
share only superficial attributes and are usually quite different, the largest mean
difference (63%) was noted between the participants pre- and post-test answers. The
covariate, the pre-test question with the least amount of influence at 27% was noted when
participants were asked their beliefs regarding members of certain racial groups sharing a
large number of underlying characteristics in addition to superficial differences or
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resemblance. These findings reveal that there is a significant difference in the depth of
cognitive salience through the malleability of the EEE processing between college
students who have participated in a multicultural psychosocial course compared to those
who have not as asked by the research question.
The following chapter will include an interpretation of the study’s findings,
limitations, potential implications for positive social change, and recommendations for
future research in the area of the cognitive EEE processes as they relate to individuals’
belief in racial and cultural differences and the role the cognitive EEE processes play.
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
The purpose of this study was to assess the effects of an 8-week multicultural
psychosocial educational course on an individual’s depths of cognitive beliefs about
racial groups and the depth of cognitive salience that could be noted in the perception of
the psychosocial norm for race as indicated through the malleability of the EEE
processes. The findings indicated a statistically significant difference in the movement of
the EEE processes with the introduction of a culturally informative and rich course and
the participant’s cognitive and salient beliefs about race. The EEE processes were shown
to be malleable by the measurement of the participant’s beliefs. Those participants who
did not take part in the multicultural psychosocial course did not show any statistically
significant movement in EEE processes over the 8-week period.
This study was conducted to investigate the malleability of an individual’s EEE
processes after being solidified during an individual’s life maturation, which is known to
lead to the freezing of the EEE processes (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Pirttlia-Backman
& Kajanne, 2001; Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). The malleability of the EEE processes was
investigated through the introduction of culturally rich information regarding the
similarities in different races as well as the differences within races regardless of their
superficial similarities, such as appearance and racial categorization.
Interpretation of Findings
Research in the area of the EEE processes has highlighted the function of these
processes as a substitution for an individual’s cognitive dispensation. An individual’s
processing of both individuals and outgroups is known to be based on perceived
similarities (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). When addressing perceived similarities, research
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has indicated that the individual is apt to view members of outgroups as essentially the
same in their behaviors, beliefs, and thought processes based on their physical
characteristics and racial category (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Additionally, studies have
indicated an individual’s epistemic processes are a powerful incentive while forming and
constructing perceived knowledge regarding outgroups (Kruglanski, 1994). The outcome
of the application of this subjectivity into social reality is due to EEE freezing and
stagnation resulting in the individual grouping outgroup members who appear the same
or identify with a particular ethnic group (Kruglanski, 1989, 2004).
The theoretical groundwork for the study was the essentialist theory of race (Chao
et al., 2013), NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996), and intergroup contact theory (Allport,
1954; Pettigrew, 1998). The essentialist theory of race refers to the individual’s EEE
processes becoming stagnant or frozen, especially those involved with essentialism (Chao
et al., 2013). NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) refers to the individual’s cognitive
epistemic need to engage in quick inferences and those that are most convenient.
Intergroup contact theory also assisted in examining whether there was an epistemic
essentialist drive depth of cognitive salience by examining the EEE processes following
the introduction of a multicultural psychosocial course (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998).
The findings of this study indicated that the seizing and freezing of the epistemic
and depth of cognitive salience through the EEE processes can become malleable
following the introduction of culturally rich and informative material. Although an
individual may theoretically engage in the NFC through intergroup contact, the
essentialist individual’s EEE processes may be changed or moved with the introduction
of culturally informative information regarding the members of a perceived outgroup.
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This study’s finding indicated that the depth of cognitive salience had been changed, and
malleability of the EEE processes had been revealed. The essentialist theory of race
(Chao et al., 2013) suggests that the EEE processes may become frozen and stagnant. The
findings in this study support this theory as indicated by the comparison group’s minimal
movement of the EEE processes as shown in their posttest results. With the introduction
of multicultural psychosocial educational material, this study was grounded in intergroup
contact theory by providing an open arena for the course participant group to address
current and previously held beliefs about outgroup members. Additionally, the data
supported NFC (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) by which an individual engages in quick,
convenient inferences that may be slowed through the intergroup contact theory. NFC
was indicated in the posttest data where the participant group provided significant
evidence of the cognitively driven consideration of essence-based differences in outgroup
members as compared to the pretest data.
Previous literature addressed the epistemological attitudes and beliefs of an
individual’s metacognitive systems of knowing (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997); those
epistemological systems consist of beliefs about nature as well as perceived processes of
knowing. Epistemic strategies serve as the individual’s knowledge-based regulatory
validation system in which the intake of information is received. Additionally, these
processes are known to assist the individual in making ethnic categorizations, which they
perceive as social reality (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). Supporting the previous literature,
the pretest data indicated that both Group A and Group B differed only slightly in the
participants’ perceived processes of knowing and conscious or subconscious perceptions
of ethnic categorizations. I assumed the volunteer sample of participants provided
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accurate information viewed as the individual’s social reality by the participant’s
responses to the pretest and posttest survey.
Epistemic cognition (EC) has been found to be a significant component of human
cognition as well as the epistemological processes (Chinn et al., 2011). Epistemological
attitudes serve as an important component of an individual’s ability to ascertain the
validity of information that has been received and cognitively processed. When presented
with interrelated topics, the individual’s current belief system will consider a perception
as truth. The understanding of all of these factors contributes to an individual’s
epistemological attitude (Chinn et al., 2011).
Described as an occurrence in infancy (Kruglanski et al., 2006), the cognitive
epistemic processes the individual utilizes are based on ambiguity, lack of information,
and assumption. This study included the introduction of additional and new information
regarding various racial groups in an attempt to unfreeze or make malleable the
individual’s EEE processes by presenting new and previously unknown thoughts,
attitudes, and characteristics about differing racial groups. The results of this study
support prior research suggesting that the EEE processes may be affected by consistent
exposure to learning experiences and interaction with and about those in perceived
outgroups.
Limitations
External validity was considered a primary limitation based on previous
experiences participants may have had prior to the study. Additionally, the degree of
uniformity of both groups prior to the multicultural psychosocial educational course was
considered as a possible threat to internal validity. This possible selection threat was
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addressed by asking the participants in the comparison group not to participate in any
multicultural educational courses for the duration of the study. Because it was not
possible to thoroughly examine the degree of participants’ current level of essentialism
based on previous experience with members of outgroups and their previous and current
environmental influences, generalizability of this study’s findings is not possible.
However, the results may be generalizable to men and women of various ages and ethnic
backgrounds who have experienced a variety of environmental, social, and psychological
influences when considering the introduction of intergroup contact and psychosocial
multicultural information.
The pretest data provided information regarding the participants’ current state of
their EEE processes. I did not consider how previous experiences with members of
outgroups may have affected each participant’s level of cognitive salience and processing
of these experiences. I addressed another confounding variable through a posttest
question asking participants to report any positive or negative interactions, life-changing
events, or trauma they endured during the 8-week period of the study. Participants in
Group A and Group B reported no personal life-changing events, trauma, or negative
interactions with outgroup members during their participation in this study. The
participants’ pretest scores were appropriately controlled for statistically through the
application of the ANCOVA to account for prior life experience, age, and sociocultural
environment that may have influenced the individual’s current EEE status. Participants
who took the multicultural psychosocial course experienced an opportunity to address
any personal prejudice or assumptions regarding outgroup members. I assumed that
participants would be honest and forthright in their responses.
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Recommendations
This study provided statistically significant findings regarding the malleability of
the EEE processes between two groups while considering pretest EEE beliefs and
cognitive salience about racial groups. Although I considered the age of participants as a
covariate, future research might address other covariates as well. Investigating gender
differences may offer additional insight into the movement or malleability of the EEE
processes between men and women. Gender may prove to be an important consideration
in future research in an attempt to assess the differences in the malleability of the EEE
processes.
Given that the freezing of the EEE processes is known to occur early in life
(Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b) and has been shown to protect the information an individual
currently processes, investigating the age of participants may offer additional knowledge
about the depth of the individual’s solidification of the EEE. Additionally, future studies
should include elementary and middle school participants to measure their beliefs about
race through the EEE processes following a multicultural psychosocial course.
Implications for Positive Social Change
This study contributes to positive social change by providing statistical support
for how the EEE cognitive processes regarding the individual’s beliefs and cognitive
salience about racial groups can be affected by a multicultural psychosocial course. This
knowledge could serve as an important catalyst in demonstrating that given the
opportunity to engage in an open and informative education that addresses not only the
differences but similarities of outgroups, an individual’s EEE processes may be malleable
to change.
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In a multicultural society, the categorization of anticipated behaviors, intelligence,
and attitudes based upon a person’s race and culture an understanding of the neuropsychological processes an individual possesses would add additional knowledge to an
individual’s beliefs about outgroup members. An investigation of the individual’s
processing of differences in an attempt to address the particular process of how he or she
arrives at a certain judgment may enhance knowledge and awareness that his or her
perceived solidified beliefs might be changed.
As has been shown in the present study, the current beliefs and cognitive salience
an individual holds regarding outgroups, as indicated through the EEE processes, can be
manipulated or changed with consistent dialog, information, and exposure to outgroups.
The consistent exposure through an 8-week multicultural psychosocial course has shown
to have a statistically significant effect on the EEE processes.
The purpose of this study was to assess the participants’ beliefs and cognitive
salience about outgroup members by measuring any movement in the their EEE
processes. The age of the participants was a covariate to control for previous life
experiences. This study supports the malleability of an individual’s current beliefs and
cognitive salience regarding members of outgroups through the introduction of
multicultural psychosocial educational material. These findings support the notion that
with the opportunity for individuals to participate in a multicultural psychosocial
educational course, stereotypical beliefs, racist actions, and xenophobia may be reduced.
Conclusion
The EEE processes are a catalyst for the development of stereotypical
assignments to members of outgroups (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996); Pirttlia-Backman
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& Kajanne, 2001); Roets & Van Hiel, 2011b). This is an empirically based assumption
that along with the results of the present study lends support for additional investigation.
With the increase in racial violence, the Black Lives Matter movement, and racial tension
on U.S. and foreign soil resulting in attacks based on perceived outgroup beliefs,
behaviors, and essence, the basis of an individual’s psychological and biological driving
forces should be investigated. Research into the social and biosocial aspects of social
psychology has become more important and timely than ever.
Based on findings from the current study as well as prior research, the
malleability of the EEE processes is possible regardless of the age of the individual. This
study has shown that with participants ranging from 18 years of age and above, the EEE
processes can be influenced by an 8-week multicultural psychosocial educational course.
The consistent exposure in such a course to the similarities, beliefs, and differences in
cultural and ethnic groups may be advantageous throughout the formal educational years.
Future studies should address age, gender, and race as factors in the introduction
of culturally rich information introduced to individuals of all ages. Additionally, based on
findings from this study supporting the malleability of the EEE processes, investigating
the consistent offering of multicultural psychosocial rich information and exposure to
outgroups should be considered and possibly mandated throughout the formal educational
years. Findings from the current study offer hope in the possibility of human cognitive
change, change in beliefs, and change in assumptions that an individual has regarding
members of outgroups.
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Appendix A: Collegewide Course Outline of Record
HUMS 270, MULTICULTURAL PRACTICE
COURSE TITLE: Multicultural Practice
COURSE NUMBER: HUMS 270
SCHOOL: Public and Social Services
CREDIT HOURS: 3
CONTACT HOURS: Lecture: 3
DATE OF LAST REVISION: Fall, 2013
EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS REVISION: Fall, 2014
CATALOG DESCRIPTION: This course examines, from a theoretical and experiential
social work perspective, the personal behaviors and institutional factors that have led to
oppression of ethnic minorities, persons of color or other oppressed populations and those
practices that serve to maintain inter-group tensions.. Attention is given to discriminatory
practices as related to gender, age, religion, disablement, sexual orientation, culture, etc.
It will explore the strategies that the various groups have employed to deal with
discrimination. Implications to the individual, society, and professions are explored.
MAJOR COURSE LEARNING OBJECTIVES: Upon successful completion of this
course the student will be expected to:
1. Expand the level of awareness of attitudes toward human diversity including race,
ethnicity, class, gender, religion, and sexual orientation, physical or mental
limitations.
2. Explain the dual/multiple perspective frame of reference and its importance for
socialization and society.
3. Explicate the concepts of stigma, stereotypes, prejudice and racism, minority,
classism, homophobia, etc.
4. Obtain a historical and contemporary perspective on ethnicity in American
society.
5. Explain the significance of ethnicity, race, gender, class, and sexual orientation in
human development and family life.
6. Discuss the strengths of various groups as evidenced in survival strategies.
7. Understand the significance and impact of human diversity on society.
8. Obtain a frame of reference for examination of issues and practices as related to
diversity, economic and social justices.
9. Utilize a research perspective in the study of ethnicity, race, gender, class, sexual
orientation or other differences that impact society.
10. Develop a commitment to empowerment strategies.
11. Learn ways in which to operationalize a personal and professional commitment to
the eradication of racism, classism, sexism, disablement, homophobia, etc.
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12. Demonstrate critical thinking skills in examination and application of the course
content.
COURSE CONTENT: Topical areas of study include:
Understanding diversity.
Define culture.
Determine need for culturally diverse socialization.
Explore changing demographics, White privilege, and culturally diverse values.
Understand socially constructed concepts for diversity.
Develop strategies for effective cross-cultural relations.
Discuss stress management and culture shock adaptation.
Explore social interaction and communication rules.
Discuss value orientation and history of ethnic communities in America.
Understand importance of immigration, gender, and religion and sexuality
difference in America.
Develop culturally sensitive practice skills to promote empowerment.
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Appendix B: Essentialist Entitativity Scale
1.

Members of a racial group are usually very similar.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

2.

Completely
Disagree

If you know to which racial group someone belongs, you know a lot about his/her
personality.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

Completely
Disagree

3. Despite apparent differences between members of the same racial group, in
essence they are the same.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

Completely
Disagree

4. Members of a racial group usually are identical in many respects.
7

6

5

4

3

2

Completely
Agree

1
Completely
Disagree

5. Membership of a racial group largely determines someone’s identity.
7
Completely
Agree

6

5

4

3

2

1
Completely
Disagree
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6. Members of a racial group share only superficial attributes, but actually they are
quite different.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

Completely
Disagree

7. Members of a racial group usually differ a lot from each other.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

Completely
Disagree

8. Knowing that someone belongs to a racial group, is not sufficient to judge a
person.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

Completely
Disagree

9. Members of certain racial groups share a large number of underlying
characteristics besides their superficial resemblances or differences.
7

6

5

4

3

2

1

Completely
Agree

Completely
Disagree

10. Members of a racial group often have not much in common.
7

6

5

4

3

2

Completely
Agree

1
Completely
Disagree

11. Membership of a particular racial group says nothing about a specific person.
7

6

Completely

5

4

3

2

1
Completely
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Agree

Disagree

12. Members of certain racial groups are often very different although they might look
similar at first glance.

7

6

5

4

Completely
Agree

Items 6, 7,8,10, 11, and 12 are reverse coded.
Uniformity Items: 1, 4, 7, and 10.
Informativeness Items: 2, 5, 8, and 11
Inherence Items: 3, 6, 9, and 12.
Total Essentialist Entitativity score = mean of all items.

3

2

1
Completely
Disagree
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Appendix C: Participant Post-Study Questionnaire

Identifier _________________________

Date________________________

Please answer the following:

1. During the 8-week period of the study were you the victim of a crime at the hands
of a member of a different race or ethnic group?

Yes

No

2. During the 8-week period of the study were you involved in any major life events
involving a member(s) of a different racial or ethnic group?

Yes

No

3. If you were a participant in the multicultural course, how many of the weekly
class meetings did you attend?

# ________________

or

_____________I did not take the course
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Appendix D: Participant Post-Study Resource List
Following is a list of resources were you can find information regarding cultural and
ethnic support groups, volunteer opportunities, and culturally specific resources.

IMMIGRANT SERVICES
BURMESE ADVOCACY CENTER
2424 Lake Avenue
Fort Wayne, IN 46805
(260) 755-2048
http://www.bacindiana.org
center@bacindiana.org

WCA NORTHEAST INDIANA
1610 Spy Run Avenue
Fort Wayne, IN 46805
(260) 424-4908 Main Office
http://www.ywca.org/nein

ASIAN HELP SERVICES
609 East 29th Street
Broadway United Methodist Church
Indianapolis, IN 46205
(317) 924-4827
http://www.asianhelpservices-in.org

NORTHERN INDIANA HISPANIC HEALTH COALITION
444 North Nappanee Street
Elkhart, IN 46514
(574) 522-0966
http://www.nihhc.com
info@nihhc.com

IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER
2236 East 10th Street
John H. Boner Community Center
Indianapolis, IN 46201
(317) 808-2326 English and Spanish
http://www.immigrantwelcomecenter.org
help@immigrantwelcomecenter.org
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IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER BRANCH AT HAWTHORNE COMMUNITY CENTER

70 North Mount Street
Indianapolis, IN 46222
http://www.immigrantwelcomecenter.org
help@immigrantwelcomecenter.org

IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER BRANCH AT SAINT MONICA CHURCH

6131 North Michigan Road
Indianapolis, IN 46228
http://www.immigrantwelcomecenter.org
help@immigrantwelcomecenter.org

IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER
IMMIGRANT WELCOME CENTER BRANCH AT SOUTHEAST COMMUNITY SERVICES

901 Shelby Street
Indianapolis, IN 46203
http://www.immigrantwelcomecenter.org
help@immigrantwelcomecenter.org

MARION COUNTY PUBLIC HEALTH DEPARTMENT
3838 North Rural Street
Hasbrook Building
Indianapolis, IN 46205
(317) 221-2106 Foreign Born Services
http://www.mchd.com

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND
CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND - SOUTH BEND COMMUNITY CENTER

1817 Miami Street
South Bend, IN 46613
(574) 234-3111
http://www.ccfwsb.org

NORTHERN INDIANA HISPANIC HEALTH COALITION
NORTHERN INDIANA HISPANIC HEALTH COALITION - WARSAW OFFICE

1515 Provident Drive, Suite 140
K21 Health Services Pavilion
Warsaw, IN 46580
(574) 372-3536
http://www.nihhc.com
info@nihhc.com

NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC
NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC - ALLEN COUNTY

347 West Berry Street, Suite 101
Fort Wayne, IN 46802
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(260) 456-8972 Automated Information Line
http://www.nclegalclinic.org/ftwayne
fwcontact@nclegalclinic.org

Immigration/Naturalization Legal Services
Programs that provide legal assistance for immigrants, nonimmigrant visa
applicants, asylum seekers and lawful permanent residents who are seeking
naturalization. Services are generally provided by nonprofit immigration law offices
and may involve information and consultation about benefits under immigration law
including procedures for obtaining student, visitor and employment-based visas;
family immigration; asylee status; lawful permanent residence status; or citizenship.

CATHOLIC CHARITIES OF FORT WAYNE-SOUTH BEND
915 South Clinton Street
Fort Wayne, IN 46802
(260) 422-5625
http://www.ccfwsb.org
fwoffice@ccfwsb.org

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF NORTHWEST INDIANA
4433 Broadway
Gary, IN 46409
(219) 980-4636 Administrative Office
http://icanwi.org/
iilc4433@hotmail.com

NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC
NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC - LAKE COUNTY

940 Broadway
Catholic Charities
Gary, IN 46402
(317) 429-4131 Automated Information Line
http://www.nclegalclinic.org
contactus@nclegalclinic.org

LACASA
202 North Cottage Avenue
Goshen, IN 46528
(574) 533-4450
http://lacasainc.net
lacasa@lacasainc.net
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NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC
NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC - HUNTINGTON COUNTY

255 West Park Drive
Huntington Library
Huntington, IN 46750
(260) 456-8972 Automated Information Line
http://www.nclegalclinic.org/ftwayne
fwcontact@nclegalclinic.org

CENTER FOR VICTIM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
201 North Illinois Street, 16th Floor South Tower
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 610-3427
http://www.cvhr.org
contact@cvhr.org

INDIANA LEGAL SERVICES
IMMIGRANTS AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS CENTER

151 North Delaware Street, Suite 1800
Market Square Center
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(866) 964-2138 Toll-Free
http://www.indianajustice.org

LATINO COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC AND SEXUAL
VIOLENCE
300 East Fall Creek Parkway North Drive, Suite 200
Julia M. Carson Government Building
Indianapolis, IN 46205
(317) 926-4673
(866) 442-4627 Toll-Free
http://www.indianalatinocoalition.org
info@indianalatinocoalition.org

NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC
3333 North Meridian Street, Suite 201
Trinity Outreach Center
Indianapolis, IN 46208
(317) 429-4131 Automated Information Line
http://www.nclegalclinic.org
contactus@nclegalclinic.org
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NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC
128 East Main Street
First Presbyterian Church of Lebanon
Lebanon, IN 46052
(317) 429-4131 Automated Information Line
http://www.nclegalclinic.org
contactus@nclegalclinic.org

DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA)
THE BRIDGE COMMUNITY CHURCH
301 East Linden Avenue
Logansport, IN 46947
(574) 753-8316
http://www.thebridgelogansport.com

NEIGHBORHOOD CHRISTIAN LEGAL CLINIC
1207 Conner Street
First Presbyterian Church of Noblesville
Noblesville, IN 46060
(317) 429-4131 Automated Information Line
http://www.nclegalclinic.org
contactus@nclegalclinic.org

EL CENTRO COMUNAL LATINO
303 East Kirkwood Avenue, Room 200
Monroe County Public Library
Bloomington, IN 47408
(812) 355-7513
http://www.elcentrocomunal.com
elcentrocomunal@gmail.com

ELKHART COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT
ELKHART COUNTY HEALTH DEPARTMENT - LINCOLN CENTER
608 Oakland Avenue
Lincoln Center
Elkhart, IN 46516
(574) 523-2283
http://www.elkhartcountyhealth.org
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MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS (MRC)
AUDIO READING SERVICE

7615 DiSalle Boulevard
Fort Wayne, IN 46845
(260) 421-1376
http://www.acpl.lib.in.us/home/audioreadingservice
audioreadingservice@acpl.info

EXODUS REFUGEE IMMIGRATION
1125 Brookside Avenue, Suite C9
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 921-0836
http://www.exodusrefugee.org

WFYI INDIANAPOLIS
1630 North Meridian Street
Indianapolis, IN 46202
(317) 614-0404 IRIS
http://www.wfyi.org

Source-United Way of Allen County - 2015
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Appendix E: Course Participant Post-Study Questionnaire

Please enter the Personal Identification Number you recorded on your consent form here:
_____________
Date (MM/DD/YY):____________
Instructions: Please answer the following.

1. If you were enrolled in HUMS 270, Multicultural Practice, this quarter, how
many of the eight class meetings were unable to attend?
____0-2
____3-5
____5-8

___ I did not take the course.

